mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Whom Do AI Agents Work For? Role Assignment Induces Sponsorship Bias in LLM Recommenders

arXiv 2609.17989 ↗First posted 16 Sep 2026econ.GN cs.AI q-fin.ECcited by 2

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Social simulation and multi-agent debate

Abstract (arXiv)

Large language models (LLMs) now serve as conversational shopping assistants on platforms that also sell advertising. These AI agents face a conflict of duty. They advise consumers who rely on their judgment, yet are deployed by platforms that benefit when sponsored listings are chosen. Sponsorship disclosures, designed to allow consumers to penalize paid placements, now reach the AI agent rather than the consumer, and the agent's evaluation of them is hidden from the consumer. Drawing on the fiduciary concept of conflict of duty, we argue that an agent's evaluation of a sponsored listing should not depend on which party deployed it. In controlled choice experiments, we manipulate assigned roles in the system prompt to name either a traveler or a booking platform as the agent's principal. Platform delegation significantly attenuates the penalty that agents apply to sponsored listings and weakens the skepticism that disclosure triggers in their reasoning traces. We replicate out findings across LLMs and reasoning depths. A second study decomposes the disclosure label and shows that the divergence between the two delegates widens significantly when the paid placement is attributed to the platform. Stricter terminology ("Sponsored" instead of "Promoted") lowers choice of paid listings but does not close this gap when the platform is named. The findings show that disclosure mandates designed for human consumers cannot by themselves protect consumers in AI-mediated commerce.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Social simulation and multi-agent debate, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 20 of its 67 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Sep 2026.

Builds on

20 of 67 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Does Rank Still Matter? Position Bias When AI Agents Shop on Our Behalf24 Aug

Other references · 19

  1. 2022Self-Consistency Improves Chain of Thought Reasoning in Language Modelscited by 5,708
  2. 2023Lost in the Middle: How Language Models Use Long Contextscited by 3,455
  3. 2019The Curious Case of Neural Text Degenerationcited by 2,916
  4. 2022Emergent Abilities of Large Language Modelscited by 2,512
  5. 2024A Survey on LLM-as-a-Judgecited by 1,423
  6. 2016Man is to Computer Programmer as Woman is to Homemaker? Debiasing Word Embeddingscited by 1,312
  7. 2023Large Language Models are not Fair Evaluatorscited by 1,085
  8. 2023Towards Understanding Sycophancy in Language Modelscited by 1,040
  9. 2016Semantics derived automatically from language corpora contain human-like biasescited by 901
  10. 2022Discovering Language Model Behaviors with Model-Written Evaluationscited by 836
  11. 2023Whose Opinions Do Language Models Reflect?cited by 773
  12. 2022Out of One, Many: Using Language Models to Simulate Human Samplescited by 752
7 more
  1. 2024LLM Evaluators Recognize and Favor Their Own Generationscited by 686
  2. 2023Large Language Models Sensitivity to The Order of Options in Multiple-Choice Questionscited by 263
  3. 2020With Little Power Comes Great Responsibilitycited by 142
  4. 2023Large Language Models as Zero-Shot Conversational Recommenderscited by 127
  5. 2023Rethinking the Evaluation for Conversational Recommendation in the Era of Large Language Modelscited by 48
  6. 2025Fragile Preferences: A Deep Dive Into Order Effects in Large Language Modelscited by 5
  7. 2026Every Token Counts: Exact Likert-Scale Distributions for Measuring LLM Attitudes and Biasescited by 3

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

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