The Vulnerability With No CVE: Managing Persistent Gaps Between Mandate and Authority in AI Coding Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Existing guidance identifies excessive agency, excessive permission, weak task-bound authorization, and inadequate agent controls as important risks. Control frameworks also describe capabilities for constraining, authorizing, observing, validating, and responding to agent activity. Yet security programs still need a way to manage persistent deployed instances that span components and outlive any one event. We propose the agentic posture vulnerability (APV) as a task-conditioned vulnerability-management abstraction: a durable record for a composed agent-control exposure. One posture may produce different runtime manifestations across tasks; APV links those manifestations to the invariant posture and remains open until authority is narrowed, a missing control is added, risk is accepted, or closure is verified. APV is not proposed as a new root-cause class of risk; it operationalizes existing excessive-agency, authorization, and control-composition weaknesses. We distinguish APVs from CVE-addressable product defects, OWASP Excessive Agency, Agent Baseline control outcomes, and the runtime authorization-execution gap. We then provide a field vignette, a thresholded definition, six recurring APV patterns, a vulnerability lifecycle, a minimum record, a control-and-closure matrix, tooling implications, and a testable research agenda.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 11 of its 34 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 Aug 2026.
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11 of 34 references.
Closest ancestors · 6
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Overeager Coding Agents: Measuring Out-of-Scope Actions on Benign Tasks18 May
- 2026Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?14 May
- 2026Runtime Governance for AI Agents: Policies on Paths17 Mar
- 2025AgentBound: Securing Execution Boundaries of AI Agents24 Oct
- 2025When Developer Aid Becomes Security Debt: A Systematic Analysis of Insecure Behaviors in LLM Coding Agents12 Jul
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
Other references · 5
- 2025Authenticated Delegation and Authorized AI Agentscited by 65
- 2026Before the Tool Call: Deterministic Pre-Action Authorization for Autonomous AI Agentscited by 13
- 2026Beyond OAuth: Task-Scoped Authorization for AI Agents via Natural Language Slicescited by 5
- 2026Intent-Governed Tool Authorization for AI Agentscited by 5
- 2026The Authorization-Execution Gap Is a Major Safety and Security Problem in Open-World Agentscited by 4
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