Beyond OAuth: Task-Scoped Authorization for AI Agents via Natural Language Slices
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
AI agents increasingly execute users' natural-language (NL) tasks by calling Web services, yet today's Web authorizes these calls through OAuth, which grants permissions over operators (e.g., TRANSFER), not operations (operator plus operands, e.g., transfer 100 to Bob). This gap cannot be closed by refining scope granularity, because operands are combinatorial, quantitative, and often derived from runtime computations across servers. Operator-scoped authorization therefore inherently overprivileges agents. We propose Precise Task-Scoped Implicit Authorization (PAuth): submitting a concrete NL task implicitly authorizes exactly the operations its faithful execution requires, even when the agent is compromised (e.g., by malware or prompt injection). Each server independently derives an NL slice, a symbolic specification of the expected call inspired by program slicing, and server-produced values are wrapped in signed envelopes that bind concrete values to symbolic provenance. Together, they enforce that every operation, not just the operator, is consistent with the user's task, closing the gap that OAuth leaves open. We evaluate PAuth on AuthBench, a benchmark we build on top of AgentDojo and cross-validate on OpenClaw, spanning five service suites with 100 benign tasks and 634 adversarial calls. All 100 benign tasks are implicitly authorized and all 634 adversarial calls are blocked. Many tasks require multiple tool calls to complete. A unique value of PAuth is that it frees users from having to approve each call with concrete operand values, including intermediate results they never specified. This enhances both security and usability.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 14 of its 39 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Mar 2026.
Builds on
14 of 39 references.
References · 14
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
- 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 568
- 2023Identifying the Risks of LM Agents with an LM-Emulated Sandboxcited by 514
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agentscited by 476
- 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 441
- 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defensescited by 328
- 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 325
- 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Designcited by 256
- 2024IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systemscited by 118
- 2024PLeak: Prompt Leaking Attacks against Large Language Model Applicationscited by 113
- 2023LLMs Cannot Reliably Identify and Reason About Security Vulnerabilities (Yet?): A Comprehensive Evaluation, Framework, and Benchmarkscited by 94
- 2025MCP Safety Audit: LLMs with the Model Context Protocol Allow Major Security Exploitscited by 61
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.
4 papers.
- 2026AID-Guard: Stateful Authorization for Delegated Agent Effectscited by 5
- 2026The Vulnerability With No CVE: Managing Persistent Gaps Between Mandate and Authority in AI Coding Agentscited by 0
- 2026AgentBetta: Verification-Driven Adaptive Configuration of an AI Nano-Agent through Selective Expansion and Verified Contractioncited by 0
- 2026LeaseGuard: Incumbent-Preserving Admission Control for Privileged LLM Agentscited by 0
- 2026LeaseGuard: Incumbent-Preserving Admission Control for Privileged LLM Agents21 Sep 2026
- 2026AgentBetta: Verification-Driven Adaptive Configuration of an AI Nano-Agent through Selective Expansion and Verified Contraction20 Sep 2026
- 2026AID-Guard: Stateful Authorization for Delegated Agent Effects21 Aug 2026
- 2026The Vulnerability With No CVE: Managing Persistent Gaps Between Mandate and Authority in AI Coding Agents6 Aug 2026