MNC: Scope-Bound Semantic Declassification for Private LLM-Agent Communication
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems can expose protected state through internal messages, tool arguments, logs, and persistent memory even when their public outputs appear innocuous. Existing privacy prompts, redaction methods, and source-level access controls restrict surface content or data access, but do not specify what a legitimately informed agent should disclose or how that disclosure may be reused downstream. We introduce Minimum-Necessary Communication (MNC), a typed semantic-declassification protocol that selects a task-sufficient disclosure from an application-authored candidate family and binds it to explicit recipient, purpose, forwarding, lifetime, logging, and memory scopes. A reference monitor enforces these scopes across subsequent operations, while a history-aware extension accounts for inference risk accumulated over repeated disclosures. Controlled semantic-join, memory, probing, and longitudinal experiments show that conventional defenses can preserve protocol-level utility while exposing substantial additional inference signal. Under identical receipt text, MNC preserves authorized delivery while blocking unauthorized forwarding, logging, durable storage, and retrieval after expiration that a text-only semantic declassifier permits. Two-backbone MAGPIE executions further show that mediated disclosures propagate through subsequent planning, tool use, coordination, and memory retrieval. These results support scope-bound semantic declassification as a practical communication boundary for private LLM-agent systems.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 12 of its 21 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Aug 2026.
Builds on
12 of 21 references.
Closest ancestors · 9
Same direction, newest first
- 2026ToolPrivacyBench: Benchmarking Purpose-Bound Privacy in Tool-Using LLM Agents26 Jun
- 2026POLAR-Bench: A Diagnostic Benchmark for Privacy-Utility Trade-offs in LLM Agents18 May
- 2026CalBench: Evaluating Coordination-Privacy Trade-offs in Multi-Agent LLMs10 May
- 2025MAGPIE: A benchmark for Multi-AGent contextual PrIvacy Evaluation16 Oct
- 2025Maris: A Formally Verifiable Privacy Policy Enforcement Paradigm for Multi-Agent Collaboration Systems7 May
- 2025Prompt Flow Integrity to Prevent Privilege Escalation in LLM Agents17 Mar
- 2025AgentDAM: Privacy Leakage Evaluation for Autonomous Web Agents12 Mar
- 2025Unveiling Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Memory17 Feb
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
Other references · 3
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
- 2023AutoGen: Enabling Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversationcited by 1,906
- 2024LongMemEval: Benchmarking Chat Assistants on Long-Term Interactive Memorycited by 656
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- 2026Selection-Invariant Communication Compilers for Privacy-Aware Multi-Agent LLM Workflows
- 2026AgentLeak: A Benchmark for Internal-Channel Privacy Leakage in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
- 2026Information-Theoretic Privacy Control for Sequential Multi-Agent LLM Systems
- 2026OCELOT: Inference-Leakage Budgets for Privacy-Preserving LLM Agents
- 2026CIPL: A Channel-Aware Framework for Recoverable Privacy Leakage in LLM Agents
- 2026AIM: A Privacy-Aware Interoperable Memory Framework for Multi-Agent Multi-User LLM Systems
- 2026The Claws in Plain Sight: Unauthorized Context Disclosure through LLM Agent Tool Calls
- 2026LLMs as Linguistic Chameleons: Decoupling Semantics and Structure for Privacy-Preserving Communication