Fragility of Value under Imperfect Alignment
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Human values and AI feedback alignment
Abstract (arXiv)
As more responsibility is placed upon AI systems, it becomes increasingly important to guarantee that these systems are aligned with humanity. A common fear in AI safety is that human value is fragile -- that is, optimizing too heavily for an imperfect proxy to human values will lead to a catastrophic outcome. In this paper, we present a model of the alignment problem where an agent undergoes idealized alignment training that guarantees its value function satisfies a proxy condition before optimizing the world. Our primary results identify conditions on the human value function and the accuracy of several proxy conditions under which an agent with an η-catastrophic value function, one that is guaranteed to take the expectation of human value below η in the limit of optimizing power, would be deployed. Our results highlight the danger of overoptimization and motivate AI designs that limit optimization pressure, such as quantilizers, rather than relying solely on pre-deployment training.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Human values and AI feedback alignment, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 12 of its 21 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Jul 2026.
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12 of 21 references.
References · 12
- 2022Scaling Laws for Reward Model Overoptimizationcited by 1,095
- 2025Monitoring Reasoning Models for Misbehavior and the Risks of Promoting Obfuscationcited by 384
- 2018Categorizing Variants of Goodhart's Lawcited by 149
- 2021Consequences of Misaligned AIcited by 80
- 2018The Surprising Creativity of Digital Evolution: A Collection of Anecdotes from the Evolutionary Computation and Artificial Life Research Communitiescited by 78
- 2017Reinforcement Learning with a Corrupted Reward Channelcited by 70
- 2018Incomplete Contracting and AI Alignmentcited by 62
- 2017Occam's razor is insufficient to infer the preferences of irrational agentscited by 45
- 2024Catastrophic Goodhart: regularizing RLHF with KL divergence does not mitigate heavy-tailed reward misspecificationcited by 23
- 2024On the Limitations of Markovian Rewards to Express Multi-Objective, Risk-Sensitive, and Modal Taskscited by 9
- 2023Consistent Aggregation of Objectives with Diverse Time Preferences Requires Non-Markovian Rewardscited by 8
- 2026Against Proxy Optimizationcited by 1
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- 2025The Specification Trap: Why Static Value Alignment Alone Is Insufficient for Robust Alignment
- 2023Absolutist AI
- 2025Intrinsic Barriers and Practical Pathways for Human-AI Alignment: An Agreement-Based Complexity Analysis
- 2025Moral Anchor System: A Predictive Framework for AI Value Alignment and Drift Prevention
- 2024Dynamic Normativity: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Value Alignment
- 2021Value alignment: a formal approach
- 2025Emergent Alignment via Competition
- 2024The AI Alignment Paradox