Consistent Aggregation of Objectives with Diverse Time Preferences Requires Non-Markovian Rewards
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Abstract (arXiv)
As the capabilities of artificial agents improve, they are being increasingly deployed to service multiple diverse objectives and stakeholders. However, the composition of these objectives is often performed ad hoc, with no clear justification. This paper takes a normative approach to multi-objective agency: from a set of intuitively appealing axioms, it is shown that Markovian aggregation of Markovian reward functions is not possible when the time preference (discount factor) for each objective may vary. It follows that optimal multi-objective agents must admit rewards that are non-Markovian with respect to the individual objectives. To this end, a practical non-Markovian aggregation scheme is proposed, which overcomes the impossibility with only one additional parameter for each objective. This work offers new insights into sequential, multi-objective agency and intertemporal choice, and has practical implications for the design of AI systems deployed to serve multiple generations of principals with varying time preference.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 35 of its 88 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 30 Sep 2023.
Builds on
35 of 88 references.
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23 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2023: 1; 2024: 2; 2025: 3; 2026: 2.
8 papers.
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- 2024Pluralistic Alignment Over Timecited by 3
- 2025Dual-Objective Reinforcement Learning with Novel Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Formulationscited by 3
- 2025The challenge of hidden gifts in multi-agent reinforcement learningcited by 1
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- 2026Rationalizing Boltzmann Rationality: An Axiomatic Characterization of Entropy-Regularized Policies19 Jul 2026
- 2025Benchmarking and Improving LLM Robustness for Personalized Generation18 Sep 2025
- 2025Dual-Objective Reinforcement Learning with Novel Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Formulations19 Jun 2025
- 2025The challenge of hidden gifts in multi-agent reinforcement learning26 May 2025
- 2024Pluralistic Alignment Over Time16 Nov 2024
- 2024A Black Swan Hypothesis: The Role of Human Irrationality in AI Safety25 Jul 2024
- 2023The History and Risks of Reinforcement Learning and Human Feedback20 Oct 2023