GIF: Locally Sound Geometric Information Flow Control for LLMs
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Large language models increasingly mediate interactions between sensitive data, untrusted inputs, and privileged actions in agentic systems, creating security and privacy risks. These range from prompt injections that manipulate downstream tool use to leakage of confidential information through model outputs. Recent Information Flow Control (IFC)-based defenses show promise but lack a principled semantic foundation for reasoning about information flow through the model itself. Since any input token may influence any output token in an autoregressive LLM, existing approaches suffer from severe taint explosion. We present Geometric Information Flow (GIF), a semantic framework for tracking information flow from input tokens to outputs. GIF uses the LLM Jacobian and local output geometry to upper-bound the Shannon mutual information between perturbed input spans and model outputs, yielding a scalable measure computable on large models via automatic differentiation and low-rank approximation. Unlike attention-based or correlational attribution heuristics, GIF satisfies local geometric soundness, and we provide a fully mechanized Lean 4 proof that it upper-bounds the true information flow induced by a given prompt under local regularity assumptions. We evaluate GIF on integrity and confidentiality tasks across multiple prompt-injection and privacy-leakage benchmarks. GIF achieves near-perfect recall even without a downstream declassifier, outperforming attention-based baselines. Combined with lightweight LLM-based declassifiers, it matches or exceeds the F1 of direct LLM-as-judge baselines such as GPT-5.5 xhigh reasoning while using up to 81x lower token cost. GIF flows detected with small surrogate models transfer to larger state-of-the-art models and other model families, even when the surrogate is up to 200x smaller, suggesting black-box deployment without gradient access.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 30 of its 53 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 22 Jun 2026.
Builds on
30 of 53 references.
Closest ancestors · 12
Same direction, newest first
- 2026AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification26 Feb
- 2025Systems Security Foundations for Agentic Computing1 Dec
- 2025Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection via Instruction-Following Intent Analysis30 Nov
- 2025MCP Security Bench (MSB): Benchmarking Attacks Against Model Context Protocol in LLM Agents14 Oct
- 2025PromptArmor: Simple yet Effective Prompt Injection Defenses21 Jul
- 2025Design Patterns for Securing LLM Agents against Prompt Injections10 Jun
- 2025Simple Prompt Injection Attacks Can Leak Personal Data Observed by LLM Agents During Task Execution1 Jun
- 2025Progent: Securing AI Agents with Privilege Control16 Apr
- 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Design24 Mar
- 2025AgentDAM: Privacy Leakage Evaluation for Autonomous Web Agents12 Mar
- 2025Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents27 Feb
- 2025RTBAS: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection and Privacy Leakage13 Feb
Other references · 18
- 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
- 2014Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examplescited by 7,364
- 2016"Why Should I Trust You?": Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifiercited by 5,070
- 2017Axiomatic Attribution for Deep Networkscited by 3,384
- 2013Deep Inside Convolutional Networks: Visualising Image Classification Models and Saliency Mapscited by 2,371
- 2023WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agentscited by 2,006
- 2017Understanding Black-box Predictions via Influence Functionscited by 1,741
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,443
- 2019Attention is not Explanationcited by 929
- 2015Automatic differentiation in machine learning: a surveycited by 855
- 2014New insights and perspectives on the natural gradient methodcited by 443
- 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 267
6 more
- 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 121
- 2024System-Level Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks: An Information Flow Control Perspectivecited by 96
- 2020Hutch++: Optimal Stochastic Trace Estimationcited by 63
- 2026Mechanistic Data Attribution: Tracing the Training Origins of Interpretable LLM Unitscited by 10
- 2025DATE-LM: Benchmarking Data Attribution Evaluation for Large Language Modelscited by 5
- 2026Jacobian Scopes: token-level causal attributions in LLMscited by 4
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.
1 paper.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2024Permissive Information-Flow Analysis for Large Language Models
- 2026Ghost in the Agent: Redefining Information Flow Tracking for LLM Agents
- 2026Confuse the Model, Control the Flow: Understanding and Mitigating Privacy Leakage from LLM Agents with Information Flow Control
- 2026Information-Theoretic Privacy Control for Sequential Multi-Agent LLM Systems
- 2026OCELOT: Inference-Leakage Budgets for Privacy-Preserving LLM Agents
- 2026LLMs as Linguistic Chameleons: Decoupling Semantics and Structure for Privacy-Preserving Communication
- 2026From Storage to Steering: Memory Control Flow Attacks on LLM Agents
- 2026The LLMbda Calculus: AI Agents, Conversations, and Information Flow