mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Governing AI-Assisted Security Operations: A Design Science Framework for Operational Decision Support

arXiv 2605.09534 ↗First posted 10 May 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Engineering managers increasingly must decide how to introduce generative artificial intelligence (AI), retrieval-augmented generation, and coding agents into high-risk operational functions without weakening accountability, privacy, cost discipline, or auditability. The central message of this study is that AI-assisted operational decision support should be managed as a governed engineering capability before it is scaled as automation. Security operations centers (SOCs) provide a suitable setting because they combine privileged telemetry, specialist expertise, software repositories, cloud services, and evidence-sensitive decisions. This study uses Kusto Query Language (KQL) and Microsoft Azure security capabilities as a bounded technical instantiation of that broader engineering management problem. KQL is read-only in ordinary query use, but read-only does not mean risk-free: AI-assisted queries can still create privacy, cost, performance, schema-validity, and decision-quality risks through broad scans, sensitive-field exposure, stale intelligence, and misleading interpretations. Using design science research, the study develops a governed AI query-broker artifact that separates AI planning from operational execution through schema-grounded retrieval, approved templates, policy validation, read-only adapters, normalized outputs, auditable agent traces, and engineering review board gates. The contribution is not a new KQL technique, security product, or detection algorithm. Rather, the study contributes a management framework for governing AI-assisted operational decision support in high-risk digital infrastructure by specifying design propositions, role accountability, maturity stages, quality gates, evaluation criteria, and evidence boundaries.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 3 of its 43 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 10 May 2026.

Builds on

3 of 43 references.

References · 3

  1. 2017On Calibration of Modern Neural Networkscited by 4,960
  2. 2017Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social Sciencescited by 1,206
  3. 2025Validity in Design Sciencecited by 4

Built on by

Not cited yet.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026The PBSAI Governance Ecosystem: A Multi-Agent AI Reference Architecture for Securing Enterprise AI Estates
  2. 2026AGL-1: The Enterprise AI Governance Layer as a Control Plane for Trusted Enterprise Intelligence
  3. 2026Large Language Models for Agentic NetOps and AIOps: Architectures, Evaluation, and Safety
  4. 2026Governed AI-Assisted Engineering: Graduated Human Oversight for Agentic Code Generation in Regulated Domains
  5. 2026LLM-Based Agents for Software and Systems Security: Approaches, Applications, and Assessment
  6. 2025Assured autonomy: How operations research powers and orchestrates generative AI systems
  7. 2026AI-GRACE: A Use-Case Operationalization Framework for Agentic AI: From Organizational Objectives and Obligations to Deployment Capabilities and Architecture
  8. 2026AI Trust OS -- A Continuous Governance Framework for Autonomous AI Observability and Zero-Trust Compliance in Enterprise Environments