mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Rethinking Penetration Testing for AI-Enabled Systems: From Resource Compromise to Behavioral Objective Violation

arXiv 2607.14006 ↗First posted 15 Jul 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

Penetration testing traditionally evaluates whether adversaries can exploit weaknesses in software, infrastructure, configurations, or operational controls to achieve security-relevant compromise. This paradigm remains necessary for AI-enabled systems, but it is no longer sufficient. In such systems, adversaries may influence prompts, retrieved content, sensor inputs, training data, memory, tools, or human-AI interaction loops to alter system behavior without directly compromising the underlying infrastructure. This paper reframes penetration testing for AI-enabled systems as objective-driven behavioral evaluation. We define an AI-enabled system as one in which learned models materially influence behavior affecting operational outcomes, and we define AI-enabled penetration as the feasible induction of AI-governed behavior that violates one or more operational objectives under an explicit threat model. This definition preserves conventional penetration testing while extending it to adversarial pathways such as prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, data poisoning, sensor manipulation, retrieval poisoning, tool misuse, and agentic misalignment. We further propose a testing workflow that identifies operational objectives, maps AI-governed behavior, analyzes adversarial influence surfaces, defines behavioral failure criteria, executes scenario-based tests, and reports evidence linking adversarial action to objective violation. A running example involving an AI-enabled security operations center assistant illustrates how penetration may occur through behavioral influence rather than infrastructure compromise. Together, the definitions, workflow, and example provide a technical framework for evaluating adversarial success in deployed AI-enabled systems.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 7 of its 19 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 15 Jul 2026.

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7 of 19 references.

Closest ancestors · 2

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queries9 Feb
  2. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection23 Feb

Other references · 5

  1. 2014Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examplescited by 7,287
  2. 2023Universal and Transferable Adversarial Attacks on Aligned Language Modelscited by 2,914
  3. 2017Wild Patterns: Ten Years After the Rise of Adversarial Machine Learningcited by 411
  4. 2024AI Agents Under Threat: A Survey of Key Security Challenges and Future Pathwayscited by 122
  5. 2026The Attack and Defense Landscape of Agentic AI: A Comprehensive Surveycited by 26

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  1. 2026From Capability to Assurance in Autonomous Penetration-Testing Harnesses: A Framework and Reference Implementation
  2. 2026Toward Secure AI-Powered Penetration Testing Agents: Security Threats, Guardrails, and Architectural Perspectives
  3. 2025xOffense: An Autonomous Multi-Agent Framework for Penetration Testing with Domain-Adapted Large Language Models
  4. 2026Rethinking Indirect Prompt Injection as a Test-Time Search Problem
  5. 2026Cyber-Capable AI Agents: Vulnerabilities, Evaluation Containment, and Defensive Response
  6. 2026From Controlled to the Wild: Evaluation of Pentesting Agents for the Real-World
  7. 2025Penetration Testing of Agentic AI: A Comparative Security Analysis Across Models and Frameworks
  8. 2026Architecting Secure AI Agents: Perspectives on System-Level Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks