mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?

arXiv 2605.11086 ↗First posted 11 May 2026cs.CR cs.AI cs.LGcited by 29

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

AI agents are rapidly gaining capabilities that could significantly reshape cybersecurity, making rigorous evaluation urgent. A critical capability is exploitation: turning a vulnerability, which is not yet an attack, into a concrete security impact, such as unauthorized file access or code execution. Exploitation is a particularly challenging task because it requires low-level program reasoning (e.g., about memory layout), runtime adaptation, and sustained progress over long horizons. Meanwhile, it is inherently dual-use, supporting defensive workflows while lowering the barrier for offense. Despite its importance and diagnostic value, exploitation remains under-evaluated. To address this gap, we introduce ExploitGym, a large-scale, diverse, realistic benchmark on the exploitation capabilities of AI agents. Given a program input that triggers a vulnerability, ExploitGym tasks agents with progressively extending it into a working exploit. The benchmark comprises 898 instances sourced from real-world vulnerabilities across three domains, including userspace programs, Google's V8 JavaScript engine, and the Linux kernel. We vary the security protections applied to each instance, isolating their impact on agent performance. All configurations are packaged in reproducible containerized environments. Our evaluation shows that while exploitation remains challenging, frontier models can successfully exploit a non-trivial fraction of vulnerabilities. For example, the strongest configurations are Anthropic's latest model Claude Mythos Preview and OpenAI's GPT-5.5, which produce working exploits for 157 and 120 instances, respectively. Notably, even with widely used defenses enabled, models retain non-trivial success rates. These results establish ExploitGym as an effective testbed for exploitation and highlight the growing cybersecurity risks posed by increasingly capable AI agents.

Key facts. Cited by 29 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 16 of its 60 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 May 2026.

Builds on

16 of 60 references.

Closest ancestors · 5

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025SEC-bench: Automated Benchmarking of LLM Agents on Real-World Software Security Tasks13 Jun
  2. 2025BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity Systems21 May
  3. 2025SecRepoBench: Benchmarking Code Agents for Secure Code Completion in Real-World Repositories29 Apr
  4. 2025CVE-Bench: A Benchmark for AI Agents' Ability to Exploit Real-World Web Application Vulnerabilities21 Mar
  5. 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct

Other references · 11

  1. 2023SWE-bench: Can Language Models Resolve Real-World GitHub Issues?cited by 3,373
  2. 2024The WMDP Benchmark: Measuring and Reducing Malicious Use With Unlearningcited by 509
  3. 2024Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Modelscited by 164
  4. 2024Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilitiescited by 128
  5. 2024NYU CTF Bench: A Scalable Open-Source Benchmark Dataset for Evaluating LLMs in Offensive Securitycited by 93
  6. 2025CyberGym: Evaluating AI Agents' Real-World Cybersecurity Capabilities at Scalecited by 78
  7. 2018The Art, Science, and Engineering of Fuzzing: A Surveycited by 62
  8. 2025BaxBench: Can LLMs Generate Correct and Secure Backends?cited by 41
  9. 2018Automatic Heap Layout Manipulation for Exploitationcited by 1
  10. 2025TYPEPULSE: Detecting Type Confusion Bugs in Rust Programscited by 1
  11. 2025Empirical Security Analysis of Software-based Fault Isolation through Controlled Fault Injectioncited by 1

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 29.

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  1. 2026ExploitBench: A Capability Ladder Benchmark for LLM Cybersecurity Agentscited by 19
  2. 2026AgentCyberRange: Benchmarking Frontier AI Systems in Realistic Cyber Rangescited by 4
  3. 2026Agent Hacks Agent: Autoresearch for Production-Agent Red-Teamingcited by 2
  4. 2026Antares: Foundation Models for Agentic Vulnerability Localizationcited by 2
  5. 2026Cyber-Capable AI Agents: Vulnerabilities, Evaluation Containment, and Defensive Responsecited by 1
  6. 2026The Next Challenge for Agentic Cybersecurity: A Realistic, Contamination-Free Reverse Engineering Benchmarkcited by 1
  7. 2026From Capability to Assurance in Autonomous Penetration-Testing Harnesses: A Framework and Reference Implementationcited by 1
  8. 2026SecProbe: Adaptive Evaluation of Coding Agents on Cybersecurity Vulnerabilitiescited by 1
  9. 2026MiMo-V2.6: Scaling Reinforcement Learning Towards Self-Improvementcited by 1
  10. 2026Transferable Self-Evolving Playbooks for Agentic Security Auditingcited by 0
  11. 2026Red-Teaming the Agentic Red-Teamcited by 0
  12. 2026CyberChainBench: Can AI Agents Secure Smart Contracts Against Real-World On-Chain Vulnerabilities?cited by 0
17 more
  1. 2026Chai: Agentic Discovery of Cryptographic Misuse Vulnerabilitiescited by 0
  2. 2026SysEvolve: An AI-native, safe, autonomous adversarial attack-defense co-evolutionary systemcited by 0
  3. 2026CyberFactory: Scaling Cyber Security Capabilities with Instances from the Wildcited by 0
  4. 2026Benchmark Contamination: A Taxonomy Organized by Defeated Mitigationcited by 0
  5. 2026Same Request, Different Boundary: Evaluating Cybersecurity Assistance across Conversational Contextscited by 0
  6. 2026Feyospace-v1: How the Cyber Mercury Seven Trained Frontier Cyber Modelscited by 0
  7. 2026Vulnerability Localization Benchmark: Measuring Agentic Security Analysis at Repository Scalecited by 0
  8. 2026Inference-Engine Fingerprinting Attacks are Practical: Exploring Model-Driven Environmental Discovery, Exploitation, and Escapecited by 0
  9. 2026SelfOp: An Optimization Algorithm for Self-Improving Security Agentscited by 0
  10. 2026Evaluating Coding Agents on Kernel Exploit Generationcited by 0
  11. 2026Codoku: Renewable Program-Reasoning Challenges for Frontier Coding Agentscited by 0
  12. 2026AuraForge: Scaling Security Supervision for Training Coding Agentscited by 0
  13. 2026Mean field games as a tool for AI safety: a worked example from the July 2026 Hugging Face incidentcited by 0
  14. 2026Natural Code Transformation Confuses Agents in Vulnerability Analysiscited by 0
  15. 2026Last Secure Code Benchmark: Is the Code You Vibe Secure?cited by 0
  16. 2026CWE-bench: Refocusing Agentic Security from Exploitation to Defensecited by 0
  17. 2026ProtoArena: Can AI Agents Discover and Exploit Real-World Cross-Component Protocol Vulnerabilities?cited by 0

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scale
  2. 2026To Defend Against Cyber Attacks, We Must Teach AI Agents to Hack
  3. 2026Mapping the Exploitation Surface: A 10,000-Trial Taxonomy of What Makes LLM Agents Exploit Vulnerabilities
  4. 2026AgenticVM: Agentic AI for Adaptive Software Vulnerability Management
  5. 2026ZeroDayBench: Evaluating LLM Agents on Unseen Zero-Day Vulnerabilities for Cyberdefense
  6. 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Exploit One-day Vulnerabilities
  7. 2025Bridging AI and Software Security: A Comparative Vulnerability Assessment of LLM Agent Deployment Paradigms
  8. 2025SecureVibeBench: Benchmarking Secure Vibe Coding of AI Agents via Reconstructing Vulnerability-Introducing Scenarios