mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Security Considerations for Artificial Intelligence Agents

arXiv 2603.12230 ↗First posted 12 Mar 2026cs.LG cs.AI cs.CRcited by 7

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Abstract (arXiv)

This article, a lightly adapted version of Perplexity's response to NIST/CAISI Request for Information 2025-0035, details our observations and recommendations concerning the security of frontier AI agents. These insights are informed by Perplexity's experience operating general-purpose agentic systems used by millions of users and thousands of enterprises in both controlled and open-world environments. Agent architectures change core assumptions around code-data separation, authority boundaries, and execution predictability, creating new confidentiality, integrity, and availability failure modes. We map principal attack surfaces across tools, connectors, hosting boundaries, and multi-agent coordination, with particular emphasis on indirect prompt injection, confused-deputy behavior, and cascading failures in long-running workflows. We then assess current defenses as a layered stack: input-level and model-level mitigations, sandboxed execution, and deterministic policy enforcement for high-consequence actions. Finally, we identify standards and research gaps, including adaptive security benchmarks, policy models for delegation and privilege control, and guidance for secure multi-agent system design aligned with NIST risk management principles.

Key facts. Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 26 of its 45 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Mar 2026.

Builds on

26 of 45 references.

References · 26

  1. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  2. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
  3. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructionscited by 441
  4. 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defensescited by 328
  5. 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 325
  6. 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Designcited by 256
  7. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 233
  8. 2024InFoBench: Evaluating Instruction Following Ability in Large Language Modelscited by 128
  9. 2024IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systemscited by 118
  10. 2026Agent Skills for Large Language Models: Architecture, Acquisition, Security, and the Path Forwardcited by 105
  11. 2024Attention Tracker: Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMscited by 82
  12. 2024Can LLMs Separate Instructions From Data? And What Do We Even Mean By That?cited by 70
14 more
  1. 2024Instructional Segment Embedding: Improving LLM Safety with Instruction Hierarchycited by 62
  2. 2024Get my drift? Catching LLM Task Drift with Activation Deltascited by 61
  3. 2025DRIFT: Dynamic Rule-Based Defense with Injection Isolation for Securing LLM Agentscited by 59
  4. 2025Contextual Agent Security: A Policy for Every Purposecited by 55
  5. 2025IHEval: Evaluating Language Models on Following the Instruction Hierarchycited by 48
  6. 2025IPIGuard: A Novel Tool Dependency Graph-Based Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agentscited by 46
  7. 2025Control Illusion: The Failure of Instruction Hierarchies in Large Language Modelscited by 31
  8. 2026Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic Coding Assistants: A Systematic Analysis of Vulnerabilities in Skills, Tools, and Protocol Ecosystemscited by 30
  9. 2025LLM Agents Should Employ Security Principlescited by 28
  10. 2024SysBench: Can Large Language Models Follow System Messages?cited by 26
  11. 2025BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agentscited by 23
  12. 2024ConfusedPilot: Confused Deputy Risks in RAG-based LLMscited by 22
  13. 2025ThinkTrap: Denial-of-Service Attacks against Black-box LLM Services via Infinite Thinkingcited by 22
  14. 2024SoK: Prompt Hacking of Large Language Modelscited by 5

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 7.

7 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2025Systems Security Foundations for Agentic Computing
  2. 2026Rethinking Agent Security as a Networking Problem
  3. 2026Securing Agentic AI: From Per-Action Checks to Trajectory Assurance
  4. 2024Security of AI Agents
  5. 2026When the Agent Is the Adversary: Architectural Requirements for Agentic AI Containment After the April 2026 Frontier Model Escape
  6. 2026Architecting Secure AI Agents: Perspectives on System-Level Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
  7. 2026Architecture Matters for Multi-Agent Security
  8. 2025Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition