mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data

arXiv 2604.19657 ↗First posted 21 Apr 2026cs.CR cs.AI cs.OScited by 3

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Abstract (arXiv)

AI agents promise to serve as general-purpose personal assistants for their users, which requires them to have access to private user data (e.g., personal and financial information). This poses a serious risk to security and privacy: an AI model may hallucinate or make mistakes, and adversaries may attack it (e.g., via prompt injection) to exfiltrate user data. This paper presents GAAP (Guaranteed Accounting for Agent Privacy), an execution environment for AI agents that guarantees confidentiality for private user data. Crucially, GAAP provides this guarantee deterministically, without trusting the agent with private user data, and without requiring any AI model or the user prompt to be free of attacks. Through dynamic and directed user prompts, GAAP collects permission specifications from users describing how their private data may be shared. GAAP then enforces that the agent's data disclosures comply with these specifications by tracking how the AI agent accesses and uses private user data. GAAP augments Information Flow Control with novel persistent data stores and annotations that enable tracking the private information flow both across steps of a single task and over multiple separate tasks. Our evaluation confirms that GAAP blocks all data disclosure attacks, including those that make other state-of-the-art systems disclose private user data to untrusted parties, with only a small impact on agent utility.

Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 50 of its 107 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 21 Apr 2026.

Builds on

50 of 107 references.

References · 50

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38 more
  1. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Basescited by 402
  2. 2023Formalizing and Benchmarking Prompt Injection Attacks and Defensescited by 328
  3. 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 325
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  5. 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Designcited by 256
  6. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlightingcited by 233
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  13. 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 108
  14. 2025The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against Llm Jailbreaks and Prompt Injectionscited by 108
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  17. 2024System-Level Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks: An Information Flow Control Perspectivecited by 91
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  25. 2025Red Teaming the Mind of the Machine: A Systematic Evaluation of Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Vulnerabilities in LLMscited by 34
  26. 2024Llama Guard 3-1B-INT4: Compact and Efficient Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 24
  27. 2024Permissive Information-Flow Analysis for Large Language Modelscited by 22
  28. 2025Fun-tuning: Characterizing the Vulnerability of Proprietary LLMs to Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attacks via the Fine-Tuning Interfacecited by 15
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  32. 2026PrivGemo: Privacy-Preserving Dual-Tower Graph Retrieval for Empowering LLM Reasoning with Memory Augmentationcited by 9
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  34. 2025Personalizing Agent Privacy Decisions via Logical Entailmentcited by 4
  35. 2025Can LLMs Make (Personalized) Access Control Decisions?cited by 3
  36. 2026How Well Can LLM Agents Simulate End-User Security and Privacy Attitudes and Behaviors?cited by 3
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  38. 2026Opal: Private Memory for Personal AIcited by 1

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.

3 papers.