The Optimal Sample Complexity of Linear Contracts
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
In this paper, we settle the problem of learning optimal linear contracts from data in the offline setting, where agent types are drawn from an unknown distribution and the principal's goal is to design a contract that maximizes her expected utility. Specifically, our analysis shows that the simple Empirical Utility Maximization (EUM) algorithm yields an varepsilon-approximation of the optimal linear contract with probability at least 1-δ, using just O(ln(1/δ) / varepsilon2) samples. This result improves upon previously known bounds and matches a lower bound from D"utting et al. 2025 up to constant factors, thereby proving its optimality. Furthermore, our result establishes the stronger guarantee of uniform convergence: the empirical utility of every linear contract is an varepsilon-approximation of its true expectation with probability at least 1-δ, using the same optimal O(ln(1/δ) / varepsilon2) sample complexity.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 24 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 4 Jan 2026.
Builds on
24 of 40 references.
References · 24
- 2015The Sample Complexity of Revenue Maximizationcited by 48
- 2014Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problemscited by 46
- 2022The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Designcited by 35
- 2018Simple versus Optimal Contractscited by 33
- 2020Contracts under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selectioncited by 21
- 2020The Complexity of Contractscited by 16
- 2022Multi-Agent Contractscited by 14
- 2024Incentivized Learning in Principal-Agent Bandit Gamescited by 13
- 2018Learning Approximately Optimal Contractscited by 12
- 2021Bayesian Agency: Linear versus Tractable Contractscited by 12
- 2021Combinatorial Contractscited by 12
- 2021Contracts with Private Cost per Unit-of-Effortcited by 12
12 more
- 2022Designing Menus of Contracts Efficiently: The Power of Randomizationcited by 10
- 2024Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Surveycited by 8
- 2024Are Bounded Contracts Learnable and Approximately Optimal?cited by 6
- 2023The Power of Menus in Contract Designcited by 5
- 2023On Supermodular Contracts and Dense Subgraphscited by 5
- 2023Learning Optimal Contracts: How to Exploit Small Action Spacescited by 5
- 2024Multi-Agent Combinatorial Contractscited by 5
- 2019Optimal Common Contract with Heterogeneous Agentscited by 4
- 2023On the (In)approximability of Combinatorial Contractscited by 4
- 2025The Pseudo-Dimension of Contractscited by 3
- 2023Combinatorial Contracts Beyond Gross Substitutescited by 2
- 2024A Reduction from Multi-Parameter to Single-Parameter Bayesian Contract Designcited by 2
Built on by
Not cited yet.