mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Large Empirical Case Study: Go-Explore adapted for AI Red Team Testing

arXiv 2601.00042 ↗First posted 31 Dec 2025cs.CR cs.AI cs.LGcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

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Abstract (arXiv)

Production LLM agents with tool-using capabilities require security testing despite their safety training. We adapt Go-Explore to evaluate GPT-4o-mini across 28 experimental runs spanning six research questions. We find that random-seed variance dominates algorithmic parameters, yielding an 8x spread in outcomes; single-seed comparisons are unreliable, while multi-seed averaging materially reduces variance in our setup. Reward shaping consistently harms performance, causing exploration collapse in 94% of runs or producing 18 false positives with zero verified attacks. In our environment, simple state signatures outperform complex ones. For comprehensive security testing, ensembles provide attack-type diversity, whereas single agents optimize coverage within a given attack type. Overall, these results suggest that seed variance and targeted domain knowledge can outweigh algorithmic sophistication when testing safety-trained models.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 4 of its 19 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 31 Dec 2025.

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4 of 19 references.

References · 4

  1. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  2. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
  3. 2020First return, then explorecited by 256
  4. 2022The Alignment Problem from a Deep Learning Perspectivecited by 246

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