mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Beyond Success Rate: Cost-Aware Evaluation of Offensive and Defensive Security Agents

arXiv 2607.15263 ↗First posted 16 Jul 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 1

Not on the map. Why?

Abstract (arXiv)

Security-agent evaluations commonly measure peak offensive capability under generous inference budgets, emphasizing vulnerability discovery, exploit development, penetration testing, and CTF completion. Such measurements are useful but incomplete: in operational security, every reasoning step, tool call, telemetry query, and enrichment request consumes budget. We evaluate language-model security agents through this cost-success lens on offensive Cybench challenges and defensive Splunk BOTS v1 investigation challenges. Instead of reporting only best-case success, we compare models at fixed cost levels and decompose performance by inference spend and tool spend. Our results show distinct scalingregimes for red- and blue-team tasks. Offensive CTF performance improves with additional test-time compute, and scaled open-weight models can approach frontier proprietary systems while remaining cost-competitive. Defensive SOC investigation does not scale in the same way: success depends more heavily on disciplined tool use, telemetry navigation, and selective enrichment than on raw reasoning budget alone. We argue that security-agent benchmarks should measure economic efficiency and operational fit alongside task success. Cost-aware, SOC-native evaluations provide a clearer picture of which models are practically useful today and where defensive agents still need to improve. We present an interactive website with our results https://evals.frontier.security.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 18 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Jul 2026.

Builds on

18 of 30 references.

References · 18

  1. 2023InterCode: Standardizing and Benchmarking Interactive Coding with Execution Feedbackcited by 238
  2. 2024Leak, Cheat, Repeat: Data Contamination and Evaluation Malpractices in Closed-Source LLMscited by 229
  3. 2024Cybench: A Framework for Evaluating Cybersecurity Capabilities and Risks of Language Modelscited by 164
  4. 2024Benchmark Data Contamination of Large Language Models: A Surveycited by 147
  5. 2023Stop Uploading Test Data in Plain Text: Practical Strategies for Mitigating Data Contamination by Evaluation Benchmarkscited by 142
  6. 2024Benchmarking Benchmark Leakage in Large Language Modelscited by 106
  7. 2025CVE-Bench: A Benchmark for AI Agents' Ability to Exploit Real-World Web Application Vulnerabilitiescited by 96
  8. 2024NYU CTF Bench: A Scalable Open-Source Benchmark Dataset for Evaluating LLMs in Offensive Securitycited by 93
  9. 2024CyberSecEval 2: A Wide-Ranging Cybersecurity Evaluation Suite for Large Language Modelscited by 89
  10. 2024EnIGMA: Interactive Tools Substantially Assist LM Agents in Finding Security Vulnerabilitiescited by 52
  11. 2025BountyBench: Dollar Impact of AI Agent Attackers and Defenders on Real-World Cybersecurity Systemscited by 40
  12. 2024SecBench: A Comprehensive Multi-Dimensional Benchmarking Dataset for LLMs in Cybersecuritycited by 21
6 more
  1. 2025ExCyTIn-Bench: Evaluating LLM agents on Cyber Threat Investigationcited by 15
  2. 2024Benchmark Inflation: Revealing LLM Performance Gaps Using Retro-Holdoutscited by 14
  3. 2024Hacking CTFs with Plain Agentscited by 14
  4. 2025Benchmarking LLMs in an Embodied Environment for Blue Team Threat Huntingcited by 4
  5. 2026Before You Hand Over the Wheel: Evaluating LLMs for Security Incident Analysiscited by 4
  6. 2026Cyber Defense Benchmark: Agentic Threat Hunting Evaluation for LLMs in SecOpscited by 4

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Systematic Capability Benchmarking of Frontier Large Language Models for Offensive Cyber Tasks
  2. 2026Baselines Before Architecture: Evaluating Coding Agents for Autonomous Penetration Testing
  3. 2026Cyber-Capable AI Agents: Vulnerabilities, Evaluation Containment, and Defensive Response
  4. 2026PocketAgents: A Manifest-Driven Library of Autonomous Defense Agents
  5. 2026Towards Optimal Agentic Architectures for Offensive Security Tasks
  6. 2025Dynamic Risk Assessments for Offensive Cybersecurity Agents
  7. 2026Autonomous LLM Agents & CTFs: A Second Look
  8. 2026Agentic Security: A Systematization of Tools, Failure Modes, and Design Laws for LLM-Driven Penetration Testing