Game Theory Meets LLM and Agentic AI: Reimagining Cybersecurity for the Age of Intelligent Threats

arXiv 2507.10621 ↗First posted 14 Jul 2025cs.CR cs.AI cs.CYcited by 10

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Protecting cyberspace requires not only advanced tools but also a shift in how we reason about threats, trust, and autonomy. Traditional cybersecurity methods rely on manual responses and brittle heuristics. To build proactive and intelligent defense systems, we need integrated theoretical frameworks and software tools. Game theory provides a rigorous foundation for modeling adversarial behavior, designing strategic defenses, and enabling trust in autonomous systems. Meanwhile, software tools process cyber data, visualize attack surfaces, verify compliance, and suggest mitigations. Yet a disconnect remains between theory and practical implementation. The rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) and agentic AI offers a new path to bridge this gap. LLM-powered agents can operationalize abstract strategies into real-world decisions. Conversely, game theory can inform the reasoning and coordination of these agents across complex workflows. LLMs also challenge classical game-theoretic assumptions, such as perfect rationality or static payoffs, prompting new models aligned with cognitive and computational realities. This co-evolution promises richer theoretical foundations and novel solution concepts. Agentic AI also reshapes software design: systems must now be modular, adaptive, and trust-aware from the outset. This chapter explores the intersection of game theory, agentic AI, and cybersecurity. We review key game-theoretic frameworks (e.g., static, dynamic, Bayesian, and signaling games) and solution concepts. We then examine how LLM agents can enhance cyber defense and introduce LLM-driven games that embed reasoning into AI agents. Finally, we explore multi-agent workflows and coordination games, outlining how this convergence fosters secure, intelligent, and adaptive cyber systems.

Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 45 of its 79 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 14 Jul 2025.

Builds on

45 of 79 references.

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33 more

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2025: 3; 2026: 7.

10 papers.

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