Symbiotic Game and Foundation Models for Cyber Deception Operations in Strategic Cyber Warfare
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Abstract (arXiv)
We are currently facing unprecedented cyber warfare with the rapid evolution of tactics, increasing asymmetry of intelligence, and the growing accessibility of hacking tools. In this landscape, cyber deception emerges as a critical component of our defense strategy against increasingly sophisticated attacks. This chapter aims to highlight the pivotal role of game-theoretic models and foundation models (FMs) in analyzing, designing, and implementing cyber deception tactics. Game models (GMs) serve as a foundational framework for modeling diverse adversarial interactions, allowing us to encapsulate both adversarial knowledge and domain-specific insights. Meanwhile, FMs serve as the building blocks for creating tailored machine learning models suited to given applications. By leveraging the synergy between GMs and FMs, we can advance proactive and automated cyber defense mechanisms by not only securing our networks against attacks but also enhancing their resilience against well-planned operations. This chapter discusses the games at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare, delves into the symbiotic relationship between these methodologies, and explores relevant applications where such a framework can make a substantial impact in cybersecurity. The chapter discusses the promising direction of the multi-agent neurosymbolic conjectural learning (MANSCOL), which allows the defender to predict adversarial behaviors, design adaptive defensive deception tactics, and synthesize knowledge for the operational level synthesis and adaptation. FMs serve as pivotal tools across various functions for MANSCOL, including reinforcement learning, knowledge assimilation, formation of conjectures, and contextual representation. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the challenges associated with FMs and their application in the domain of cybersecurity.
Key facts. Cited by 7 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 41 of its 114 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 14 Mar 2024.
Builds on
41 of 114 references.
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 2; 2025: 3; 2026: 2.
7 papers.
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- 2026In-Context Autonomous Network Incident Response: An End-to-End Large Language Model Agent Approachcited by 4
- 2024Learning from Response not Preference: A Stackelberg Approach for LLM Detoxification using Non-parallel Datacited by 3
- 2025From Texts to Shields: Convergence of Large Language Models and Cybersecuritycited by 3
- 2026Agentic Incident Response through Digital Twin-Enhanced Multiscale Planningcited by 1
- 2024The Game-Theoretic Symbiosis of Trust and AI in Networked Systemscited by 0
- 2026Agentic Incident Response through Digital Twin-Enhanced Multiscale Planning3 Aug 2026
- 2026In-Context Autonomous Network Incident Response: An End-to-End Large Language Model Agent Approach13 Feb 2026
- 2025Agentic AI for Cyber Resilience: A New Security Paradigm and Its System-Theoretic Foundations28 Dec 2025
- 2025Online Incident Response Planning under Model Misspecification through Bayesian Learning and Belief Quantization20 Aug 2025
- 2025From Texts to Shields: Convergence of Large Language Models and Cybersecurity1 May 2025
- 2024The Game-Theoretic Symbiosis of Trust and AI in Networked Systems19 Nov 2024
- 2024Learning from Response not Preference: A Stackelberg Approach for LLM Detoxification using Non-parallel Data27 Oct 2024