Incentive Mechanism Design for Unbiased Federated Learning with Randomized Client Participation
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Abstract (arXiv)
Incentive mechanism is crucial for federated learning (FL) when rational clients do not have the same interests in the global model as the server. However, due to system heterogeneity and limited budget, it is generally impractical for the server to incentivize all clients to participate in all training rounds (known as full participation). The existing FL incentive mechanisms are typically designed by stimulating a fixed subset of clients based on their data quantity or system resources. Hence, FL is performed only using this subset of clients throughout the entire training process, leading to a biased model because of data heterogeneity. This paper proposes a game theoretic incentive mechanism for FL with randomized client participation, where the server adopts a customized pricing strategy that motivates different clients to join with different participation levels (probabilities) for obtaining an unbiased and high performance model. Each client responds to the server's monetary incentive by choosing its best participation level, to maximize its profit based on not only the incurred local cost but also its intrinsic value for the global model. To effectively evaluate clients' contribution to the model performance, we derive a new convergence bound which analytically predicts how clients' arbitrary participation levels and their heterogeneous data affect the model performance. By solving a non-convex optimization problem, our analysis reveals that the intrinsic value leads to the interesting possibility of bidirectional payment between the server and clients. Experimental results using real datasets on a hardware prototype demonstrate the superiority of our mechanism in achieving higher model performance for the server as well as higher profits for the clients.
Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 26 of its 46 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Apr 2023.
Builds on
26 of 46 references.
References · 26
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14 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2024: 1; 2025: 4; 2026: 3.
8 papers.
- 2025Ten Challenging Problems in Federated Foundation Modelscited by 20
- 2025Incentivizing Multi-Tenant Split Federated Learning for Foundation Models at the Network Edgecited by 1
- 2024Beyond Right to be Forgotten: Managing Heterogeneity Side Effects Through Strategic Incentivescited by 0
- 2025Cooperative SGD with Dynamic Mixing Matricescited by 0
- 2025Gaming and Cooperation in Federated Learning: What Can Happen and How to Monitor Itcited by 0
- 2026Mechanism Design for Federated Learning with Non-Monotonic Network Effectscited by 0
- 2026Incentive-Aware Federated Averaging with Performance Guarantees under Strategic Participationcited by 0
- 2026Federated Learning by Utility-Constrained Stochastic Aggregation for Improving Rational Participationcited by 0
- 2026Federated Learning by Utility-Constrained Stochastic Aggregation for Improving Rational Participation18 May 2026
- 2026Incentive-Aware Federated Averaging with Performance Guarantees under Strategic Participation21 Mar 2026
- 2026Mechanism Design for Federated Learning with Non-Monotonic Network Effects8 Jan 2026
- 2025Gaming and Cooperation in Federated Learning: What Can Happen and How to Monitor It2 Sep 2025
- 2025Cooperative SGD with Dynamic Mixing Matrices20 Aug 2025
- 2025Incentivizing Multi-Tenant Split Federated Learning for Foundation Models at the Network Edge6 Mar 2025
- 2025Ten Challenging Problems in Federated Foundation Models14 Feb 2025
- 2024Beyond Right to be Forgotten: Managing Heterogeneity Side Effects Through Strategic Incentives19 Oct 2024