Mechanism Design for Federated Learning with Non-Monotonic Network Effects
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Abstract (arXiv)
Mechanism design is pivotal to federated learning (FL) for maximizing social welfare by coordinating self-interested clients. Existing mechanisms, however, often overlook the network effects of client participation and the diverse model performance requirements (i.e., generalization error) across applications, leading to suboptimal incentives and social welfare, or even inapplicability in real deployments. To address this gap, we explore incentive mechanism design for FL with network effects and application-specific requirements of model performance. We develop a theoretical model to quantify the impact of network effects on heterogeneous client participation, revealing the non-monotonic nature of such effects. Based on these insights, we propose a Model Trading and Sharing (MoTS) framework, which enables clients to obtain FL models through either participation or purchase. To further address clients' strategic behaviors, we design a Social Welfare maximization with Application-aware and Network effects (SWAN) mechanism, exploiting model customer payments for incentivization. Experimental results on a hardware prototype demonstrate that our SWAN mechanism outperforms existing FL mechanisms, improving social welfare by up to 352.42% and reducing extra incentive costs by 93.07%.
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References · 30
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- 2021Federated Learning for Smart Healthcare: A Surveycited by 182
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18 more
- 2018A Marketplace for Data: An Algorithmic Solutioncited by 75
- 2019Federated Learning for Edge Networks: Resource Optimization and Incentive Mechanismcited by 75
- 2020Cost-Effective Federated Learning Designcited by 61
- 2021Incentive Mechanisms for Federated Learning: From Economic and Game Theoretic Perspectivecited by 47
- 2023Recent Advances on Federated Learning: A Systematic Surveycited by 40
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- 2023Federated Learning under Heterogeneous and Correlated Client Availabilitycited by 18
- 2021Data Pricing in Machine Learning Pipelinescited by 17
- 2023Incentive Mechanism Design for Unbiased Federated Learning with Randomized Client Participationcited by 8
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- 2023Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Federated Learning with Crowdsourced Data Labelingcited by 4
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- 2023Federated Learning as a Network Effects Gamecited by 1
- 2024Social Welfare Maximization for Federated Learning with Network Effectscited by 1
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