Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion
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Abstract (arXiv)
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender repeatedly faces one or more receivers with unknown and adversarially selected types. First, we show how to obtain a tight tilde O(T1/2) regret bound in the case in which the sender faces a single receiver and has partial feedback, improving over the best previously known bound of tilde O(T4/5). Then, we provide the first no-regret guarantees for the multi-receiver setting under partial feedback. Finally, we show how to design no-regret algorithms with polynomial per-iteration running time by exploiting type reporting, thereby circumventing known intractability results on online Bayesian persuasion. We provide efficient algorithms guaranteeing a O(T1/2) regret upper bound both in the single- and multi-receiver scenario when type reporting is allowed.
Key facts. Cited by 16 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 2 Mar 2023.
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Citing papers per year: 2023: 3; 2024: 4; 2025: 5; 2026: 4.
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- 2023No-Regret Learning in Bilateral Trade via Global Budget Balancecited by 17
- 2023Strategic Apple Tastingcited by 10
- 2024Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratchcited by 8
- 2024Efficient Model-agnostic Alignment via Bayesian Persuasioncited by 8
- 2024Regret Minimization in Stackelberg Games with Side Informationcited by 7
- 2025Nearly-Optimal Bandit Learning in Stackelberg Games with Side Informationcited by 6
- 2023Algorithmic Persuasion Through Simulationcited by 4
- 2024Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Handscited by 4
- 2025Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivalscited by 2
- 2025Learning to Play Multi-Follower Bayesian Stackelberg Gamescited by 2
- 2026Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Games With Unknown Follower's Typescited by 2
- 2025Make an Offer They Can't Refuse: Grounding Bayesian Persuasion in Real-World Dialogues without Pre-Commitmentcited by 1
4 more
- 2026Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversarycited by 1
- 2025Provably Efficient Algorithm for Best Scoring Rule Identification in Online Principal-Agent Information Acquisitioncited by 0
- 2026Meta-Learning for Repeated Bayesian Persuasioncited by 0
- 2026Learning to Persuade Privately Informed Receiverscited by 0
- 2026Learning to Persuade Privately Informed Receivers30 Jul 2026
- 2026Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversary12 May 2026
- 2026Meta-Learning for Repeated Bayesian Persuasion20 Mar 2026
- 2026Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Games With Unknown Follower's Types31 Jan 2026
- 2025Make an Offer They Can't Refuse: Grounding Bayesian Persuasion in Real-World Dialogues without Pre-Commitment15 Oct 2025
- 2025Learning to Play Multi-Follower Bayesian Stackelberg Games1 Oct 2025
- 2025Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals29 May 2025
- 2025Provably Efficient Algorithm for Best Scoring Rule Identification in Online Principal-Agent Information Acquisition23 May 2025
- 2025Nearly-Optimal Bandit Learning in Stackelberg Games with Side Information31 Jan 2025
- 2024Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands1 Jul 2024
- 2024Efficient Model-agnostic Alignment via Bayesian Persuasion29 May 2024
- 2024Regret Minimization in Stackelberg Games with Side Information13 Feb 2024
4 more
- 2024Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratch5 Feb 2024
- 2023Algorithmic Persuasion Through Simulation29 Nov 2023
- 2023No-Regret Learning in Bilateral Trade via Global Budget Balance18 Oct 2023
- 2023Strategic Apple Tasting9 Jun 2023
- 2024Efficient Model-agnostic Alignment via Bayesian Persuasion29 May 2024
- 2023No-Regret Learning in Bilateral Trade via Global Budget Balancecited by 17
- 2023Strategic Apple Tastingcited by 10
- 2024Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratchcited by 8
- 2024Regret Minimization in Stackelberg Games with Side Informationcited by 7
- 2025Nearly-Optimal Bandit Learning in Stackelberg Games with Side Informationcited by 6
- 2023Algorithmic Persuasion Through Simulationcited by 4
- 2024Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Handscited by 4
- 2025Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivalscited by 2
- 2025Learning to Play Multi-Follower Bayesian Stackelberg Gamescited by 2
- 2026Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Games With Unknown Follower's Typescited by 2
- 2025Make an Offer They Can't Refuse: Grounding Bayesian Persuasion in Real-World Dialogues without Pre-Commitmentcited by 1
- 2026Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversarycited by 1
12 most cited of 15 All 15 (JSON)
- 2026Learning to Persuade Privately Informed Receivers30 Jul 2026
- 2026Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade against a Smooth Adversary12 May 2026
- 2026Meta-Learning for Repeated Bayesian Persuasion20 Mar 2026
- 2026Learning in Bayesian Stackelberg Games With Unknown Follower's Types31 Jan 2026
- 2025Make an Offer They Can't Refuse: Grounding Bayesian Persuasion in Real-World Dialogues without Pre-Commitment15 Oct 2025
- 2025Learning to Play Multi-Follower Bayesian Stackelberg Games1 Oct 2025
- 2025Learning to Incentivize in Repeated Principal-Agent Problems with Adversarial Agent Arrivals29 May 2025
- 2025Provably Efficient Algorithm for Best Scoring Rule Identification in Online Principal-Agent Information Acquisition23 May 2025
- 2025Nearly-Optimal Bandit Learning in Stackelberg Games with Side Information31 Jan 2025
- 2024Contractual Reinforcement Learning: Pulling Arms with Invisible Hands1 Jul 2024
- 2024Regret Minimization in Stackelberg Games with Side Information13 Feb 2024
- 2024Markov Persuasion Processes: Learning to Persuade from Scratch5 Feb 2024
12 newest of 15 All 15 (JSON)