Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design
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Abstract (arXiv)
Machine learning has developed a variety of tools for learning and representing high-dimensional distributions with structure. Recent years have also seen big advances in designing multi-item mechanisms. Akin to overfitting, however, these mechanisms can be extremely sensitive to the Bayesian prior that they target, which becomes problematic when that prior is only approximately known. At the same time, even if access to the exact Bayesian prior is given, it is known that optimal or even approximately optimal multi-item mechanisms run into sample, computational, representation and communication intractability barriers. We consider a natural class of multi-item mechanism design problems with very large numbers of items, but where the bidders' value distributions can be well-approximated by a topic model akin to those used in recommendation systems with very large numbers of possible recommendations. We propose a mechanism design framework for this setting, building on a recent robustification framework by Brustle et al., which disentangles the statistical challenge of estimating a multi-dimensional prior from the task of designing a good mechanism for it, and robustifies the performance of the latter against the estimation error of the former. We provide an extension of this framework appropriate for our setting, which allows us to exploit the expressive power of topic models to reduce the effective dimensionality of the mechanism design problem and remove the dependence of its computational, communication and representation complexity on the number of items.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 19 of its 49 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 25 Oct 2021.
Builds on
19 of 49 references.
References · 19
- 2018Automated Mechanism Design via Neural Networkscited by 31
- 2016Learning Simple Auctionscited by 23
- 2019Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustnesscited by 22
- 2017Learning Multi-item Auctions with (or without) Samplescited by 18
- 2014Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolistcited by 17
- 2018The Sample Complexity of Up-to-varepsilon Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximizationcited by 17
- 2014Duality and Optimality of Auctions for Uniform Distributionscited by 12
- 2017A Sample Complexity Measure with Applications to Learning Optimal Auctionscited by 11
- 2013Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Designcited by 10
- 2014A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyercited by 9
- 2018A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Designcited by 9
- 2014Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximizationcited by 7
7 more
- 2014An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applicationscited by 7
- 2016Optimal Auctions with Restricted Allocationscited by 7
- 2015Mechanism Design via Optimal Transportcited by 6
- 2016Simple Mechanisms for Subadditive Buyers via Dualitycited by 6
- 2016The Menu-Size Complexity of Revenue Approximationcited by 3
- 2013Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizationscited by 2
- 2016Mechanism Design for Subadditive Agents via an Ex-Ante Relaxationcited by 2
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Citing papers per year: 2023: 2.
2 papers.