A Sample Complexity Measure with Applications to Learning Optimal Auctions
Not on the map. Why?
Abstract (arXiv)
We introduce a new sample complexity measure, which we refer to as split-sample growth rate. For any hypothesis H and for any sample S of size m, the split-sample growth rate hatτH(m) counts how many different hypotheses can empirical risk minimization output on any sub-sample of S of size m/2. We show that the expected generalization error is upper bounded by Oleft(√fraclog(hatτH(2m))mright). Our result is enabled by a strengthening of the Rademacher complexity analysis of the expected generalization error. We show that this sample complexity measure, greatly simplifies the analysis of the sample complexity of optimal auction design, for many auction classes studied in the literature. Their sample complexity can be derived solely by noticing that in these auction classes, ERM on any sample or sub-sample will pick parameters that are equal to one of the points in the sample.
Key facts. Cited by 11 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). First posted on arXiv 9 Apr 2017.
Builds on
No reference list yet.
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2021: 2; 2022: 3; 2023: 1; 2024: 1; 2025: 2; 2026: 2.
11 papers.
- 2022Optimal-er Auctions through Attentioncited by 26
- 2022Accelerating ERM for data-driven algorithm design using output-sensitive techniquescited by 8
- 2022Benefits of Permutation-Equivariance in Auction Mechanismscited by 7
- 2023New Guarantees for Learning Revenue Maximizing Menus of Lotteries and Two-Part Tariffscited by 4
- 2021Robust Learning of Optimal Auctionscited by 3
- 2021Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Designcited by 2
- 2025Learning Optimal Posted Prices for a Unit-Demand Buyercited by 1
- 2024Achieving PAC Guarantees in Mechanism Design through Multi-Armed Banditscited by 0
- 2025Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctionscited by 0
- 2026Pricing Query Complexity of Multiplicative Revenue Approximationcited by 0
- 2026On the Learning Curves of Revenue Maximizationcited by 0
- 2026On the Learning Curves of Revenue Maximization29 Apr 2026
- 2026Pricing Query Complexity of Multiplicative Revenue Approximation11 Feb 2026
- 2025Learning to Coordinate Bidders in Non-Truthful Auctions3 Jul 2025
- 2025Learning Optimal Posted Prices for a Unit-Demand Buyer2 Jun 2025
- 2024Achieving PAC Guarantees in Mechanism Design through Multi-Armed Bandits30 Nov 2024
- 2023New Guarantees for Learning Revenue Maximizing Menus of Lotteries and Two-Part Tariffs22 Feb 2023
- 2022Benefits of Permutation-Equivariance in Auction Mechanisms11 Oct 2022
- 2022Accelerating ERM for data-driven algorithm design using output-sensitive techniques7 Apr 2022
- 2022Optimal-er Auctions through Attention26 Feb 2022
- 2021Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design25 Oct 2021
- 2021Robust Learning of Optimal Auctions13 Jul 2021