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A Robust Multi-Item Auction Design with Statistical Learning

arXiv 2302.00941 ↗First posted 2 Feb 2023cs.GT stat.MLcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

We propose a novel statistical learning method for multi-item auctions that incorporates credible intervals. Our approach employs nonparametric density estimation to estimate credible intervals for bidder types based on historical data. We introduce two new strategies that leverage these credible intervals to reduce the time cost of implementing auctions. The first strategy screens potential winners' value regions within the credible intervals, while the second strategy simplifies the type distribution when the length of the interval is below a threshold value. These strategies are easy to implement and ensure fairness, dominant-strategy incentive compatibility, and dominant-strategy individual rationality with a high probability, while simultaneously reducing implementation costs. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our strategies using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism and evaluate their performance through simulation experiments. Our results show that the proposed strategies consistently outperform alternative methods, achieving both revenue maximization and cost reduction objectives.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 10 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Feb 2023.

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References · 10

  1. 2016Fairness in Learning: Classic and Contextual Banditscited by 167
  2. 2016Learning Simple Auctionscited by 23
  3. 2019Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustnesscited by 22
  4. 2017Learning Multi-item Auctions with (or without) Samplescited by 18
  5. 2013Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Designcited by 10
  6. 2018A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Designcited by 9
  7. 2014Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximizationcited by 7
  8. 2014An n-to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applicationscited by 7
  9. 2016The Menu-Size Complexity of Revenue Approximationcited by 3
  10. 2021Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Designcited by 2

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