Exploration and Incentives in Reinforcement Learning
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Abstract (arXiv)
How do you incentivize self-interested agents to textitexplore when they prefer to textitexploit? We consider complex exploration problems, where each agent faces the same (but unknown) MDP. In contrast with traditional formulations of reinforcement learning, agents control the choice of policies, whereas an algorithm can only issue recommendations. However, the algorithm controls the flow of information, and can incentivize the agents to explore via information asymmetry. We design an algorithm which explores all reachable states in the MDP. We achieve provable guarantees similar to those for incentivizing exploration in static, stateless exploration problems studied previously. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to consider mechanism design in a stateful, reinforcement learning setting.
Key facts. Cited by 11 papers in the map (data through 13 Oct 2026). Builds on 16 of its 71 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 Feb 2021.
Builds on
16 of 71 references.
References · 16
- 2017Minimax Regret Bounds for Reinforcement Learningcited by 501
- 2019Introduction to Multi-Armed Banditscited by 479
- 2020Reward-Free Exploration for Reinforcement Learningcited by 177
- 2017Unifying PAC and Regret: Uniform PAC Bounds for Episodic Reinforcement Learningcited by 175
- 2013Bandits with Knapsackscited by 163
- 2015Sample Complexity of Episodic Fixed-Horizon Reinforcement Learningcited by 105
- 2017Mostly Exploration-Free Algorithms for Contextual Banditscited by 85
- 2015Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Bandit Explorationcited by 53
- 2014Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problemscited by 46
- 2016Bayesian Exploration: Incentivizing Exploration in Bayesian Gamescited by 37
- 2020The Price of Incentivizing Exploration: A Characterization via Thompson Sampling and Sample Complexitycited by 26
- 2018Incentivizing Exploration with Selective Data Disclosurecited by 24
4 more
- 2020Greedy Algorithm almost Dominates in Smoothed Contextual Banditscited by 20
- 2020Competing Bandits: The Perils of Exploration Under Competitioncited by 12
- 2015Economic Recommendation Systemscited by 8
- 2018Optimal Algorithm for Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Explorationcited by 6
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2023: 2; 2024: 3; 2025: 3; 2026: 3.
11 papers.
- 2024Incentivized Learning in Principal-Agent Bandit Gamescited by 13
- 2023Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agentscited by 7
- 2023Algorithmic Censoring in Dynamic Learning Systemscited by 5
- 2024Learning to Mitigate Externalities: the Coase Theorem with Hindsight Rationalitycited by 3
- 2024Improved Online Learning Algorithms for CTR Prediction in Ad Auctionscited by 2
- 2025Truthful mechanisms for linear bandit games with private contextscited by 1
- 2025Competitive Multi-armed Bandit Games for Resource Sharingcited by 0
- 2025Geometry Meets Incentives: Sample-Efficient Incentivized Exploration with Linear Contextscited by 0
- 2026Microeconomic Foundations of Multi-Agent Learningcited by 0
- 2026Collaborating in Multi-Armed Bandits with Strategic Agentscited by 0
- 2026On Incentivized Exploration beyond Bayesianism and Full-Informationcited by 0
- 2026On Incentivized Exploration beyond Bayesianism and Full-Information14 Jul 2026
- 2026Collaborating in Multi-Armed Bandits with Strategic Agents13 May 2026
- 2026Microeconomic Foundations of Multi-Agent Learning6 Jan 2026
- 2025Geometry Meets Incentives: Sample-Efficient Incentivized Exploration with Linear Contexts2 Jun 2025
- 2025Competitive Multi-armed Bandit Games for Resource Sharing26 Mar 2025
- 2025Truthful mechanisms for linear bandit games with private contexts7 Jan 2025
- 2024Learning to Mitigate Externalities: the Coase Theorem with Hindsight Rationality28 Jun 2024
- 2024Incentivized Learning in Principal-Agent Bandit Games6 Mar 2024
- 2024Improved Online Learning Algorithms for CTR Prediction in Ad Auctions29 Feb 2024
- 2023Algorithmic Censoring in Dynamic Learning Systems15 May 2023
- 2023Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Unobserved Agent Rewards and Perfect-Knowledge Agents14 Apr 2023