mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Who Keeps the Gains from Personal AI Assistants? Seller Adaptation and the Unassisted in a Language-Model Market Simulation

arXiv 2610.05823 ↗First posted 5 Oct 2026cs.MA cs.AI econ.GNcited by 0

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Abstract (arXiv)

Personal AI assistants are beginning to transact for consumers, and early adopters capture real savings. Whether those savings survive, and what happens to consumers who have no assistant, depends on how sellers respond -- a question single-user evidence cannot answer. We build an agent-based rental market in which language models play consumers, assistants, and six adaptive sellers guided by an algorithmic pricing tool. Half the population receives an assistant under an advisory or an executing mandate; the contract pairs a fee only the renter's physical action avoids with a pre-selected add-on an authorised assistant can cancel online. An analytical benchmark and a behaviourally calibrated rule market supply ex-ante predictions, and paired branches with frozen versus adaptive sellers separate adoption effects from market feedback. Across thirty simulated markets, executing assistants cut adopters' spending by 13.7 USD per renter-day when sellers are frozen; adaptation claws back about a third, leaving 8.7, with the gains arriving both as lower bills and as rentals completed at all. Sellers raise headline rates while cutting fees, and the calibrated forecast of the burden on unassisted consumers (+3.6) does not transfer: their mean spending change is +0.4, confidence interval -0.6 to +1.3. Seller-model swaps and a within-market transfer of fee-setting to the pricing tool show that fee conduct, and with it the division of the gains, is decided on the seller side. Assistants, we conclude, should be evaluated at market level -- completion, total spending, and non-users included -- and the comparison layers locate exactly where a calibrated behavioural forecast fails in a language-model market.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 20 of its 51 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 5 Oct 2026.

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20 of 51 references.

References · 20

  1. 2023Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behaviorcited by 3,568
  2. 2022Out of One, Many: Using Language Models to Simulate Human Samplescited by 752
  3. 2022Using Large Language Models to Simulate Multiple Humans and Replicate Human Subject Studiescited by 515
  4. 2025Investigating the Impact of Dark Patterns on LLM-Based Web Agentscited by 17
  5. 2025Dark Patterns Meet GUI Agents: LLM Agent Susceptibility to Manipulative Interfaces and the Role of Human Oversightcited by 16
  6. 2026How Agents Ask for Permission: User Permissions for AI Agents, from Interfaces to Enforcementcited by 4
  7. 2026Does Rank Still Matter? Position Bias When AI Agents Shop on Our Behalfcited by 4
  8. 2026Broken Gates: Re-evaluating Web Bot Defenses in the Age of LLM Agentscited by 3
  9. 2026Agentic Markets: Equilibrium Effects of Improving Consumer Searchcited by 2
  10. 2026Agent Bazaar: Enabling Economic Alignment in Multi-Agent Marketplacescited by 2
  11. 2026Towards an Agent-First Web: Redesigning the Web for AI Agentscited by 2
  12. 2026Simulated Customers Never Walk Away: Decision Fidelity of LLM User Simulators Measured Against Real Purchase Outcomescited by 2
8 more
  1. 2026Strategic Buying Agentscited by 2
  2. 2026Emergent Misaligned Communication in Long-Horizon Multi-Agent LLM Commercecited by 2
  3. 2026Knowledge-Verified Emergent Deception in LLM Agents Under Conflicting Incentivescited by 2
  4. 2026When Guardrails Look Effective: Construct Validity Failures in LLM Agent Commerce Evaluationcited by 2
  5. 2026From Product Search to Preference Articulation: The Economics of Agentic Commercecited by 1
  6. 2026Competitive Market Behavior of LLMscited by 1
  7. 2026The Profit Alignment Problem: How Profit Mandates Induce Alignment Failures in LLMscited by 1
  8. 2026But How Would AI Agents Run a Town's Economy?cited by 1

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