How Agents Ask for Permission: User Permissions for AI Agents, from Interfaces to Enforcement
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
As AI agents gain prevalence, users are increasingly exposed to the risks such systems entail. Prompt injection attacks, as well as hallucination, can cause agents to leak private information to third parties. As autonomous systems, agents also present the more active danger of performing sensitive tasks, such as bank transactions, without the user's intent or authorization. Recognizing this challenge, the agentic security community has developed numerous proposals for secure agentic systems. Much of this work has focused on product-level approaches, where agentic system developers determine and apply the same security policies and permissions to all users. Yet different users have different needs and preferences, necessitating support for user-level permissions policies in agentic AI systems. To understand how user-level permissions are handled in AI agent systems, we survey 21 proposals for agent permissions systems. From this review, we construct a taxonomy of how different systems specify user-level permissions policies, both at the user interface and internally; derive internal policies from user input; and enforce those policies at run-time. We then analyze five prominent commercial agents and compare their permissions handling to agentic permissions systems in the literature. We identify several high-level themes across the literature and commercial agents, as well as multiple gaps where future work is needed.
Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 23 of its 58 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 15 Jul 2026.
Builds on
23 of 58 references.
Closest ancestors · 11
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Janus: a Playground for User-Involved Agentic Permission Management1 Jul
- 2026Reframing LLM Agent Security as an Agent-Human Interaction Problem23 May
- 2026Deep-Research Agents Can Be Poisoned via User-Generated Content22 May
- 2026Formal Policy Enforcement for Real-World Agentic Systems18 Feb
- 2025Secure and Efficient Access Control for Computer-Use Agents via Context Space26 Sep
- 2025AgentSentinel: An End-to-End and Real-Time Security Defense Framework for Computer-Use Agents9 Sep
- 2025DRIFT: Dynamic Rule-Based Defense with Injection Isolation for Securing LLM Agents13 Jun
- 2025ShieldAgent: Shielding Agents via Verifiable Safety Policy Reasoning26 Mar
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
- 2024AirGapAgent: Protecting Privacy-Conscious Conversational Agents8 May
- 2024IsolateGPT: An Execution Isolation Architecture for LLM-Based Agentic Systems8 Mar
Other references · 12
- 2023A Survey on Large Language Model based Autonomous Agentscited by 2,242
- 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 365
- 2024Security and Privacy Challenges of Large Language Models: A Surveycited by 186
- 2025AI Agents vs. Agentic AI: A Conceptual Taxonomy, Applications and Challengescited by 169
- 2025The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against Llm Jailbreaks and Prompt Injectionscited by 129
- 2024System-Level Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks: An Information Flow Control Perspectivecited by 96
- 2025Contextual Agent Security: A Policy for Every Purposecited by 59
- 2025ACE: A Security Architecture for LLM-Integrated App Systemscited by 55
- 2025VeriSafe Agent: Safeguarding Mobile GUI Agent via Logic-based Action Verificationcited by 22
- 2025Towards Automating Data Access Permissions in AI Agentscited by 21
- 2026Tracking Conversations: Measuring Content and Identity Exposure on AI Chatbotscited by 3
- 2021Capability-based access control for multi-tenant systems using OAuth 2.0 and Verifiable Credentialscited by 2
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.
4 papers.
- 2026Agent Memory Is a Surface for Endogenous Authorization Launderingcited by 5
- 2026Do User-Authored Permission Policies Improve Protection Against AI Agent Overreach?cited by 0
- 2026DelegationBench: Measuring When AI Agents Should Ask Before Actingcited by 0
- 2026Who Keeps the Gains from Personal AI Assistants? Seller Adaptation and the Unassisted in a Language-Model Market Simulationcited by 0
- 2026Who Keeps the Gains from Personal AI Assistants? Seller Adaptation and the Unassisted in a Language-Model Market Simulation5 Oct 2026
- 2026DelegationBench: Measuring When AI Agents Should Ask Before Acting4 Oct 2026
- 2026Agent Memory Is a Surface for Endogenous Authorization Laundering1 Sep 2026
- 2026Do User-Authored Permission Policies Improve Protection Against AI Agent Overreach?27 Aug 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Architecting Secure AI Agents: Perspectives on System-Level Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
- 2025On the Regulatory Potential of User Interfaces for AI Agent Governance
- 2025Who Grants the Agent Power? Defending Against Instruction Injection via Task-Centric Access Control
- 2025Systems Security Foundations for Agentic Computing
- 2024Security of AI Agents
- 2025Agentic AI Security: Threats, Defenses, Evaluation, and Open Challenges
- 2026Authorization Architectures for Tool-Using AI Agents
- 2026Rethinking Agent Security as a Networking Problem