MemLeak: Cross-User Semantic Leakage in Multi-Tenant AI Agent Memory
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Abstract (arXiv)
Personal AI agents in enterprise multi-tenant deployments share a common vector store for long-term memory. Shared embedding spaces create a surface for cross-user memory leakage: a user's query can retrieve semantically adjacent memories belonging to another user through ordinary cosine-similarity retrieval, without any exploit. We formalize this as cross-user admissibility failure and evaluate it across six experiments, plus follow-up ablations, under both sparse (TF-IDF) and production-faithful (MiniLM-L6-v2) retrieval. Non-adversarial, incidental leakage reaches 70--100% under pooled same-team retrieval; adversarially crafted memories achieve 90--100% top-k placement, exceeding weaker keyword-based attacker baselines, with score lifts of +0.416 to +0.511 under production-faithful dense retrieval (Config B); and end-to-end response contamination reaches 5.00/5 under a production retrieval path and 4.67/5 with Claude Sonnet~4.5, with contaminated responses often scoring as helpful or more helpful than clean ones, a gap validated against human judgment. Among three architectural mitigations, only hard post-retrieval ownership gating consistently restores the clean baseline (1.00/5) across two generation models, at a measured latency overhead of roughly 1.4~ms per query.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Builds on 24 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 3 Oct 2026.
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References · 24
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- 2022Text Embeddings by Weakly-Supervised Contrastive Pre-trainingcited by 1,253
- 2025A-MEM: Agentic Memory for LLM Agentscited by 1,063
12 more
- 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 832
- 2025Mem0: Building Production-Ready AI Agents with Scalable Long-Term Memorycited by 779
- 2024LongMemEval: Benchmarking Chat Assistants on Long-Term Interactive Memorycited by 707
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- 2026When Personalization Legitimizes Risks: Uncovering Safety Vulnerabilities in Personalized Dialogue Agentscited by 7
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