AI Harness: Certification under Proposal-Conditioned Information for Foundation-Model Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Foundation-model agents are often modeled as policies over an observed state. In deployed systems, however, a runtime may intervene only after the model has emitted a semantic proposal, making the proposal both an action candidate and a decision-time observation generated by a history-conditioned process. We show that collapsing this structure into a state-only proposal envelope can preserve proposal coverage while destroying certifiability. In a finite robust interface, the viability kernel of the collapsed model is contained in the physical projection of the history-augmented kernel, and the collapse is lossless exactly when every proposal-conditioned collapsed fiber retains a common robust-safe intervention. This gap can be maximal even with constant-size proposal and history alphabets. The same common-action condition yields a dual result: observing the current proposal can restore robust feasibility when it separates latent modes requiring incompatible interventions. We extend these one-step results over time using exact finite beliefs and standard safety and reachability fixed points, separating indefinite operational viability from finite worst-case verified progress. Controlled model-in-the-loop tests reproduce the predicted obstructions when telemetry or effect verification is removed or intervention authority is restricted. Thus, our contribution is not a new fixed-point calculus, but a characterization of when proposal--history correlation at the model--tool boundary is necessary for certification.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 6 of its 20 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 26 Sep 2026.
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6 of 20 references.
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- 2026Towards Verifiably Safe Tool Use for LLM Agents12 Jan
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
Other references · 4
- 2017Safe Reinforcement Learning via Shieldingcited by 449
- 2022Safe Reinforcement Learning via Shielding under Partial Observabilitycited by 56
- 2021Run Time Assurance for Safety-Critical Systems: An Introduction to Safety Filtering Approaches for Complex Control Systemscited by 27
- 2026AI Harness Engineering: A Runtime Substrate for Foundation-Model Software Agentscited by 20
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