mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Containment Verification: AI Safety Guarantees Independent of Alignment

arXiv 2605.09045 ↗First posted 9 May 2026cs.AI cs.CR cs.SEcited by 1

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Agentic frameworks are the software layer through which AI agents act in the world. Existing safety methods intervene on the model and therefore remain conditional on unverifiable properties of learned behavior. We introduce containment verification, which locates safety guarantees in the agentic framework itself. Under havoc oracle semantics, the AI is modeled as an unconstrained oracle over the framework's typed action space, and the verified containment layer must enforce the boundary policy for every typed action value the AI can emit. For boundary-enforceable properties, expressed over modeled boundary events, action arguments, and state, we prove a universal guarantee by forward-simulation refinement and mechanize it in Dafny. We instantiate the paradigm by verifying PocketFlow, a minimalist agentic LLM framework, and use an agentic synthesis pipeline to generate the specification, operational model, and refinement proof under an information barrier against tautological specifications. To our knowledge, this is the first deductive formal verification of an agentic framework. The guarantee is independent of alignment because it quantifies over the framework's typed action boundary rather than over model behavior.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 12 of its 30 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 May 2026.

Builds on

12 of 30 references.

Closest ancestors · 2

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025VeriGuard: Enhancing LLM Agent Safety via Verified Code Generation3 Oct
  2. 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training10 Jan

Other references · 10

  1. 2023Language Models Don't Always Say What They Think: Unfaithful Explanations in Chain-of-Thought Promptingcited by 1,081
  2. 2023Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 743
  3. 2023Measuring Faithfulness in Chain-of-Thought Reasoningcited by 668
  4. 2022The Alignment Problem from a Deep Learning Perspectivecited by 246
  5. 2023AI Control: Improving Safety Despite Intentional Subversioncited by 207
  6. 2022Is Power-Seeking AI an Existential Risk?cited by 101
  7. 2025Dafny as Verification-Aware Intermediate Language for Code Generationcited by 6
  8. 2025ATLAS: Automated Toolkit for Large-Scale Verified Code Synthesiscited by 3
  9. 2025How Catastrophic is Your LLM? Certifying Risk in Conversationcited by 2
  10. 2026Spec-Harness: Measuring and Improving Behavioral Adequacy of LLM-Synthesized Formal Specificationscited by 2

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

1 paper.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026The Containment Gap: How Deployed Agentic AI Frameworks Fail Public-Facing Safety Requirements
  2. 2026Harness as an Asset: Enforcing Determinism via the Convergent AI Agent Framework (CAAF)
  3. 2026Position: A Three-Layer Probabilistic Assume-Guarantee Architecture Is Structurally Required for Safe LLM Agent Deployment
  4. 2025SENTINEL: A Multi-Level Formal Framework for Safety Evaluation of Foundation Model-based Embodied Agents
  5. 2026Agent Behavioral Contracts: Formal Specification and Runtime Enforcement for Reliable Autonomous AI Agents
  6. 2026Formal Verification of Agentic Systems over Operational Data
  7. 2026Agentic Model Checking
  8. 2026Engineering Reliable Commit Gates for Agentic AI: Cost-Aware Verification Portfolios under Common-Mode Data Failures