mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Understanding and Exploiting Initialization Anchoring Weakness in Feedback-Based Agent Planning

arXiv 2609.29697 ↗First posted 31 Aug 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Feedback-based planning improves agent reliability by incorporating tool observations and corrective feedback. However, its protection may not be distributed uniformly across planning stages. We conduct a round-wise analysis of four representative feedback mechanisms and uncover an initialization anchoring weakness: the first feedback round corrects 46% of adversarial directions, whereas the rates fall to 13% and 7% among directions surviving into the next two rounds. Our analysis attributes this weakness to three interacting factors: a contextually plausible shift in the initial plan, insufficient counterevidence, and the persistence of accepted directions in the accumulated trajectory. Based on these findings, we propose textscInitAnchor, a black-box framework for exploiting this weakness through attacker-controlled external materials. It operationalizes the three factors as directional-shift, contextual-plausibility, and counterevidence-resilience signals under either limited target access or no target access. Across 112 tasks from 16 domains, six agent architectures, and five backbone LLMs, textscInitAnchor achieves average ASRs of 76.1% and 72.0% under the two settings while reducing first-round mitigation rates to 21.0% and 25.0%, respectively. It also remains effective against six defenses and across six real-world agent systems. These findings show that feedback-based agents can retain early biases even when later correction is available.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 20 of its 61 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 31 Aug 2026.

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20 of 61 references.

Closest ancestors · 7

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026From Risk Classification to Action Plan Remediation: A Guardrail Feedback Driven Framework for LLM Agents4 Jun
  2. 2026PlanGuard: Defending Agents against Indirect Prompt Injection via Planning-based Consistency Verification11 Apr
  3. 2025ObliInjection: Order-Oblivious Prompt Injection Attack to LLM Agents with Multi-source Data10 Dec
  4. 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks22 Apr
  5. 2025Defeating Prompt Injections by Design24 Mar
  6. 2025UDora: A Unified Red Teaming Framework against LLM Agents by Dynamically Hijacking Their Own Reasoning28 Feb
  7. 2025MELON: Provable Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in AI Agents7 Feb

Other references · 13

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
  2. 2023ToolLLM: Facilitating Large Language Models to Master 16000+ Real-world APIscited by 1,880
  3. 2023AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agentscited by 1,211
  4. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,124
  5. 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
  6. 2023GPTFUZZER: Red Teaming Large Language Models with Auto-Generated Jailbreak Promptscited by 520
  7. 2023SmoothLLM: Defending Large Language Models Against Jailbreaking Attackscited by 434
  8. 2024Understanding the planning of LLM agents: A surveycited by 414
  9. 2023Detecting Language Model Attacks with Perplexitycited by 411
  10. 2025Thought Anchors: Which LLM Reasoning Steps Matter?cited by 126
  11. 2023ReST meets ReAct: Self-Improvement for Multi-Step Reasoning LLM Agentcited by 78
  12. 2024Cognitive Overload Attack:Prompt Injection for Long Contextcited by 13
1 more
  1. 2026Measuring Real-World Prompt Injection Attacks in LLM-based Resume Screeningcited by 3

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  3. 2026Indirect tipping: a social attack surface in AI agent populations
  4. 2026Convergent Detour Hijacking: Task-Preserving Resource Amplification in Skill-Based LLM Agents
  5. 2026SKILL0: In-Context Agentic Reinforcement Learning for Skill Internalization
  6. 2026PlanFlip: Attacking Multi-Agent LLM Systems via Planning-Phase Prompt Injection
  7. 2023AdaPlanner: Adaptive Planning from Feedback with Language Models
  8. 2026VATS: Exploiting Implicit Authority in Error-Path Injection via Systematic Mutation