Convergent Detour Hijacking: Task-Preserving Resource Amplification in Skill-Based LLM Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
LLM agents increasingly rely on third-party skills, using natural-language descriptions for selection and instruction bodies for planning. This progressive-disclosure design exposes two sequential control points to untrusted publishers: a static skill may steer an otherwise correct task onto an unnecessarily costly trajectory. Prior work studies selection manipulation, malicious skill instructions, and tool-chain resource amplification largely separately, leaving their end-to-end composition unclear. We introduce Convergent Detour Hijacking (CDH), a text-only, runtime-independent attack that couples these stages. Under shared semantic cover, a description establishes relevance during selection, while an aligned body reuses that rationale to fabricate plausible dependencies during planning. CDH attracts an attacker-controlled coordinator alongside legitimate skills, recruits unnecessary benign skills into a bounded detour, and then re-enters the original route to preserve task completion. We evaluate it across multiple LLM backends and 491 held-out tasks under single-task and multi-turn conditions. On DeepSeek-V4-Pro, the matched coordinator is selected in 80.02% of tasks; among coordinator-hit runs that complete tasks, token consumption and end-to-end execution time increase by 66.91% and 92.45%, respectively, while aggregate task completion remains comparable. Thus, correct outcomes do not guarantee trajectory integrity or cost safety.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 20 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Aug 2026.
Builds on
20 of 27 references.
Closest ancestors · 14
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Think Twice Before You Act: Protecting LLM Agents Against Tool Description Poisoning via Isolated Planning18 Jun
- 2026Exploiting LLM Agent Supply Chains via Payload-less Skills14 May
- 2026Skill Description Deception Attack against Task Routing in Internet of Agents11 May
- 2026LoopTrap: Termination Poisoning Attacks on LLM Agents7 May
- 2026RouteGuard: Internal-Signal Detection of Skill Poisoning in LLM Agents24 Apr
- 2026SkillAttack: Automated Red Teaming of Agent Skills through Attack Path Refinement5 Apr
- 2026Supply-Chain Poisoning Attacks Against LLM Coding Agent Skill Ecosystems3 Apr
- 2026Clawdrain: Exploiting Tool-Calling Chains for Stealthy Token Exhaustion in OpenClaw Agents1 Mar
- 2026Sponge Tool Attack: Stealthy Denial-of-Efficiency against Tool-Augmented Agentic Reasoning24 Jan
- 2026Beyond Max Tokens: Stealthy Resource Amplification via Tool Calling Chains in LLM Agents16 Jan
- 2026MCP-ITP: An Automated Framework for Implicit Tool Poisoning in MCP12 Jan
- 2025Attractive Metadata Attack: Inducing LLM Agents to Invoke Malicious Tools4 Aug
2 more
Other references · 6
- 2024ToolSword: Unveiling Safety Issues of Large Language Models in Tool Learning Across Three Stagescited by 82
- 2024Crabs: Consuming Resource via Auto-generation for LLM-DoS Attack under Black-box Settingscited by 35
- 2026BadSkill: Backdoor Attacks on Agent Skills via Model-in-Skill Poisoningcited by 27
- 2025Tool Preferences in Agentic LLMs are Unreliablecited by 18
- 2026Under the Hood of SKILL.md: Semantic Supply-chain Attacks on AI Agent Skill Registrycited by 12
- 2026Structured Security Auditing and Robustness Enhancement for Untrusted Agent Skillscited by 7
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.
2 papers.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Implicit Manipulation for Skill Selection in LLM Agents with Semantic Matching
- 2026PlanFlip: Attacking Multi-Agent LLM Systems via Planning-Phase Prompt Injection
- 2026Chaining Skills to Hijack LLM Agents
- 2026AgentLeak: Cloning Stronger LLM Agent Capabilities onto Weaker Agents Beyond Skill Stealing
- 2026Black-Box Skill Stealing Attack from Proprietary LLM Agents: An Empirical Study
- 2026A Finger on the Scale: Covert Policy Steering through Agentic Skills
- 2026ColluSkill: Adversarial Cross-Skill Composition for Evading Agent Skill Scanners
- 2026Reachability-Based Capability Confinement for LLM Agents under Indirect Prompt Injection