PlanGuard: Defending Agents against Indirect Prompt Injection via Planning-based Consistency Verification
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)
Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly integrated into critical systems, leveraging external tools to interact with the real world. However, this capability exposes them to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), where attackers embed malicious instructions into retrieved content to manipulate the agent into executing unauthorized or unintended actions. Existing defenses predominantly focus on the pre-processing stage, neglecting the monitoring of the model's actual behavior. In this paper, we propose PlanGuard, a training-free defense framework based on the principle of Context Isolation. Unlike prior methods, PlanGuard introduces an isolated Planner that generates a reference set of valid actions derived solely from user instructions. In addition, we design a Hierarchical Verification Mechanism that first enforces strict hard constraints to block unauthorized tool invocations, and subsequently employs an Intent Verifier to validate whether parameter deviations are benign formatting variances or malicious hijacking. Experiments on the InjecAgent benchmark demonstrate that PlanGuard effectively neutralizes these attacks, reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) from 72.8% to 0%, while maintaining an acceptable False Positive Rate of 1.49%. Furthermore, our method is model-agnostic and highly compatible.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 20 of its 21 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Apr 2026.
Builds on
20 of 21 references.
Closest ancestors · 4
Same direction, newest first
- 2025Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection via Instruction-Following Intent Analysis30 Nov
- 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
- 2024Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training10 Jan
Other references · 16
- 2020Language Models are Few-Shot Learnerscited by 32,199
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
- 2023Toolformer: Language Models Can Teach Themselves to Use Toolscited by 4,072
- 2022Do As I Can, Not As I Say: Grounding Language in Robotic Affordancescited by 2,302
- 2023Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training Fail?cited by 1,565
- 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
- 2022Ignore Previous Prompt: Attack Techniques For Language Modelscited by 760
- 2023Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 743
- 2023Baseline Defenses for Adversarial Attacks Against Aligned Language Modelscited by 608
- 2023Prompt Injection attack against LLM-integrated Applicationscited by 568
- 2022LLM-Planner: Few-Shot Grounded Planning for Embodied Agents with Large Language Modelscited by 459
- 2023Detecting Language Model Attacks with Perplexitycited by 411
4 more
- 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 347
- 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 325
- 2024SecAlign: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Preference Optimizationcited by 179
- 2024Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attack to LLM-as-a-Judgecited by 123
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.
3 papers.
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluationcited by 5
- 2026Plan Pointers and Record-Directive Form in Budgeted Verification of Inherited Agent Memorycited by 0
- 2026Understanding and Exploiting Initialization Anchoring Weakness in Feedback-Based Agent Planningcited by 0
- 2026Plan Pointers and Record-Directive Form in Budgeted Verification of Inherited Agent Memory3 Sep 2026
- 2026Understanding and Exploiting Initialization Anchoring Weakness in Feedback-Based Agent Planning31 Aug 2026
- 2026Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation9 Jun 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Think Twice Before You Act: Protecting LLM Agents Against Tool Description Poisoning via Isolated Planning
- 2026ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection
- 2026ActGuard: Pre-execution Action Auditing against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
- 2025DRIFT: Dynamic Rule-Based Defense with Injection Isolation for Securing LLM Agents
- 2025IPIGuard: A Novel Tool Dependency Graph-Based Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
- 2025SIEVE: Selective Integrity Verification and Escalation for Defending LLM Agents against Indirect Prompt Injection
- 2024The Task Shield: Enforcing Task Alignment to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
- 2026Architecting Secure AI Agents: Perspectives on System-Level Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks