mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Compositional Policy Violations: When Step-Level Compliance Fails In Agentic AI Workflows

arXiv 2609.18820 ↗First posted 16 Sep 2026cs.AI cs.MAcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Agentic workflows now make consequential decisions in regulated settings, and the governance placed around them is almost entirely step-scoped: input-output classifiers, per turn rails, and span-level evaluators. The policies organizations actually hold, such as referral thresholds, authority limits, and review requirements, are properties of the whole execution rather than of any one step. This mismatch admits a failure mode we call a Compositional Policy Violation (CPV): every individual step passes its own check while the composed execution violates the governing policy. A predicate over a single step cannot evaluate a property that step does not determine, so no improvement in the accuracy of the step-scoped monitors detects this class. We define CPVs as the failure of step-level compliance to compose, and present a taxonomy of four types: Authority Creep, Threshold Laundering, Cumulative Sum Violation, and Context Collapse. We show that the correct repair for each class is dictated by where the guarded quantity mutates. We then introduce a provenance-aware runtime architecture that evaluates policies over complete execution traces, recomputing guarded quantities from raw provenance rather than the pipeline's derived representation.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 12 of its 22 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Sep 2026.

Builds on

12 of 22 references.

Closest ancestors · 4

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Cross-Session Threats in AI Agents: Benchmark, Evaluation, and Algorithms22 Apr
  2. 2026Semantic Intent Fragmentation: A Single-Shot Compositional Attack on Multi-Agent AI Pipelines8 Apr
  3. 2026SafetyDrift: Predicting When AI Agents Cross the Line Before They Actually Do28 Mar
  4. 2025AgentSpec: Customizable Runtime Enforcement for Safe and Reliable LLM Agents24 Mar

Other references · 8

  1. 2023Let's Verify Step by Stepcited by 3,789
  2. 2023Llama Guard: LLM-based Input-Output Safeguard for Human-AI Conversationscited by 1,207
  3. 2025Why Do Multi-Agent LLM Systems Fail?cited by 604
  4. 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 365
  5. 2025Constitutional Classifiers: Defending against Universal Jailbreaks across Thousands of Hours of Red Teamingcited by 181
  6. 2021The Flaws of Policies Requiring Human Oversight of Government Algorithmscited by 44
  7. 2025CIMemories: A Compositional Benchmark for Contextual Integrity of Persistent Memory in LLMscited by 26
  8. 2026When Summaries Distort Decisions: Information Fidelity in LLM-Compressed Financial Analysiscited by 2

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Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

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  2. 2026Engineering Reliable Commit Gates for Agentic AI: Cost-Aware Verification Portfolios under Common-Mode Data Failures
  3. 2026VIGIL: Runtime Enforcement of Behavioral Specifications in AI Agent Skills
  4. 2026Willful Disobedience: Automatically Detecting Failures in Agentic Traces
  5. 2026OpenAgentFlow: Enabling System-Wide Safety Boundaries for Heterogeneous AI Agent Fleets
  6. 2026Correct Is Not Governed: Provenance Integrity in Agentic Workflows
  7. 2026Authenticated Workflows: A Systems Approach to Protecting Agentic AI
  8. 2026Runtime Governance for AI Agents: Policies on Paths