mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Cognitive Admission Control: Risk-Conditioned Assurance for Consequential Actions in Agentic Distributed Systems

arXiv 2609.16313 ↗First posted 14 Sep 2026cs.DC cs.AI cs.SEcited by 2

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

In agentic distributed systems, an agent may be authorized to mutate external infrastructure while lacking evidence that the mutation is ready to execute. Cognitive Admission Control (CAC) makes this evidence requirement explicit. A policy maps a typed action and its modeled risk to assurance obligations specifying predicates, evidence classes, scope, freshness, and witness-set constraints. A deterministic evaluator distinguishes satisfied, violated, and unresolved obligations; unresolved conditions produce targeted evidence-acquisition requests. Successful admission produces a certificate binding the action, its witness manifest, and dispatch-time guards. We formalize the admission calculus and the assumptions connecting it to mediated execution. The guarantees are policy-relative: physical safety additionally requires sound evidence, an adequate environment model, and preservation of relevant conditions through the effect. A TypeScript prototype is evaluated in 2,730 controlled local trials with independent effect observation and matched fault schedules. Across 390 CAC trials, 120 effects complete without modeled harm and no harmful effects occur. A live-policy baseline achieves the same completion count but admits the constructed correlated-witness failure. Mechanism ablations isolate guard, evidence-class, structural-cut, and remediation behavior. A further 9,000 measurements exercise the complete local dispatch path with persistent replay protection. These results establish tested implementation behaviors and local costs, not production failure rates or comparisons of language-model capability.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 10 of its 18 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 14 Sep 2026.

Builds on

10 of 18 references.

Closest ancestors · 1

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Temporary Authority, Permanent Effects: Commit-Time Authorization for LLM Agents11 Jul

Other references · 9

  1. 2022Chain-of-Thought Prompting Elicits Reasoning in Large Language Modelscited by 12,302
  2. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
  3. 2023Reflexion: Language Agents with Verbal Reinforcement Learningcited by 4,064
  4. 2024Scaling LLM Test-Time Compute Optimally can be More Effective than Scaling Model Parameterscited by 1,928
  5. 2026Atomix: Timely, Transactional Tool Use for Reliable Agentic Workflowscited by 27
  6. 2026Mnemosyne: Agentic Transaction Processing for Validating and Repairing AI-generated Workflowscited by 8
  7. 2026Sovereign Assurance Boundary: Certificate-Bound Admission for Agentic Infrastructurecited by 4
  8. 2026The Illusion of Independent Quorums: Epistemic Fault Domains and Correlated Cognitive Failures in Agentic Quorumscited by 2
  9. 2026Post-Deterministic Distributed Systems: A New Foundation for Trustworthy Autonomous Infrastructurecited by 1

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Trust Is Not a Score: Runtime Assurance Contracts for High-Risk AI Agents
  2. 2026Beyond Task Success: An Evidence-Synthesis Framework for Evaluating, Governing, and Orchestrating Agentic AI
  3. 2026Agent Safety Should Be a Runtime Contract
  4. 2026When AI Agents Commit: Cognitive Serializability Across Data, Evidence, Policy, and Authority
  5. 2026One Gate Is Not Enough: Composing Stateful Pre-Action Controls for Agentic AI
  6. 2026Beyond Corrected Memory: Execution Consistency in Multi-Agent Systems
  7. 2026Position: A Three-Layer Probabilistic Assume-Guarantee Architecture Is Structurally Required for Safe LLM Agent Deployment
  8. 2026When Agents Overtrust Environmental Evidence: An Extensible Agentic Framework for Benchmarking Evidence-Grounding Defects in LLM Agents