mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

One Gate Is Not Enough: Composing Stateful Pre-Action Controls for Agentic AI

arXiv 2608.18360 ↗First posted 18 Aug 2026cs.SE cs.AI cs.CYcited by 2

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Agentic AI systems take consequential actions governed by more than one pre-action control at once: authority, resource, and evidence gates that can admit, degrade, or remediate an action before it executes. This paper's central object is remediation-induced control coupling: a remediation applied by one control can change the action, evidence, or context another control evaluates, invalidating that control's earlier judgment. We formalize this coupling and give a remediate-and-regate protocol that restores per-action soundness in the current bounded, idempotent setting under its stated assumptions. We further show that the two implemented remediation operators (evidence substitution and resource-budget downroute) do not commute -- a finite-model checker finds concrete counterexample instances -- making remediation order part of the control-plane semantics rather than an implementation detail. A governed evidence buffer that trusts its own most recent admitted write is a further instance of the same problem at the level of state -- current admissibility does not imply future reference trustworthiness -- and is vulnerable to poisoning from declared-uncovered defect classes; two mitigations reduce, not eliminate, that exposure. Supporting results establish the exact condition under which positive-weight linear aggregation of gate outcomes can compensate a member veto, a unified cross-control Evidence Set, and that composition manufactures no new detection coverage, reported honestly. Empirically, on a deterministic open-data artifact composing three published engines unmodified, CH1-CH5 meet their registered decision rules across all 30 pre-registered seeds; CH6 does so under W1 but not under the smaller W2 workflow, reported as such. This is a mechanism demonstration on open payload data with a synthetic metadata layer, not a claim about production prevalence.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 5 of its 15 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 18 Aug 2026.

Builds on

5 of 15 references.

Closest ancestors · 3

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026SARC-DQ: Runtime Data-Quality Gating for Agentic AI: Silent Evidence Defects, the Incompetence Shield, and Downstream-Only Remediation28 Jul
  2. 2026SARC: A Governance-by-Architecture Framework for Agentic AI Systems8 May
  3. 2025LlamaFirewall: An open source guardrail system for building secure AI agents6 May

Other references · 2

  1. 2026Agent Contracts: A Formal Framework for Resource-Bounded Autonomous AI Systemscited by 12
  2. 2026Green SARC: Predictive Cost and Carbon Governance for Agentic AI Systemscited by 3

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

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  2. 2025The Oversight Game: Learning to Cooperatively Balance an AI Agent's Safety and Autonomy
  3. 2026Anticipatory Human Oversight of Agentic AI: A Philosophical Account
  4. 2026When Agents Act Unwatched: The Reduced-Supervision Paradox in Agentic AI
  5. 2026Artificial Id: Drive and Persistent Alignment in Agentic AI
  6. 2026Autonomy and Agency in Agentic AI: Architectural Tactics for Regulated Contexts
  7. 2025From surveillance to signalling: escalation channels as environmental controls for agentic AI
  8. 2026DNative-Twin: Decision Graphs and Digital Twins for Reconstructable Agentic Decisions