A Finger on the Scale: Covert Policy Steering through Agentic Skills
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
Abstract (arXiv)
Reusable agent skills extend large language model (LLM) agents with task procedures, tool-use guidance, and output constraints. Yet these skills also act as externalized behavioral policies, which create a supply-chain risk: a third-party skill may preserve the declared task and valid output interface while covertly redirecting agent decisions toward an undisclosed objective. We formalize Skill Policy Integrity, which requires a Skill-induced policy to remain aligned with its declared functionality and the user-authorized objective. We further present SkillShift, a constrained black-box framework for covert policy steering without explicit target command injection or task hijacking. It combines semantically plausible policy edits with hierarchical validation, failure-guided optimization, and strategy compression to preserve effectiveness, output validity, transferability, and inconspicuousness. We instantiate this threat in agentic commerce and software dependency use, with SkillShift achieving attacker-favored selection rates of 81.33% and 63.33% while maintaining a 100% utility-preserving rate. The frozen policies also transfer without further optimization across heterogeneous LLM backends and agent environments. Moreover, the evaluated scanners fail to detect the constructed skills, motivating behavioral auditing of reusable skills as agent policy artifacts.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 10 of its 70 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Sep 2026.
Builds on
10 of 70 references.
Closest ancestors · 5
Same direction, newest first
- 2026Trust Me, Import This: Dependency Steering Attacks via Malicious Agent Skills10 May
- 2026SkillAttack: Automated Red Teaming of Agent Skills through Attack Path Refinement5 Apr
- 2025MPMA: Preference Manipulation Attack Against Model Context Protocol16 May
- 2025Prompt Injection Attack to Tool Selection in LLM Agents28 Apr
- 2024R-Judge: Benchmarking Safety Risk Awareness for LLM Agents18 Jan
Other references · 5
- 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
- 2023AutoGen: Enabling Next-Gen LLM Applications via Multi-Agent Conversationcited by 1,906
- 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queriescited by 325
- 2025Bias Beware: The Impact of Cognitive Biases on LLM-Driven Product Recommendationscited by 10
- 2024Unveiling and Mitigating Bias in Large Language Model Recommendations: A Path to Fairnesscited by 6
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Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Black-Box Skill Stealing Attack from Proprietary LLM Agents: An Empirical Study
- 2026AgentLeak: Cloning Stronger LLM Agent Capabilities onto Weaker Agents Beyond Skill Stealing
- 2026Reachability-Based Capability Confinement for LLM Agents under Indirect Prompt Injection
- 2026Convergent Detour Hijacking: Task-Preserving Resource Amplification in Skill-Based LLM Agents
- 2026Agent Skill Security: Threat Models, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
- 2026SkillAtlas: An Attack Trace Library for Agent Skills
- 2026SkCC: Portable and Secure Skill Compilation for Cross-Framework LLM Agents
- 2026SoK: Agentic Skills -- Beyond Tool Use in LLM Agents