mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Optimizing Agent Planning for Security and Autonomy

arXiv 2602.11416 ↗First posted 11 Feb 2026cs.CR cs.LGcited by 10

On the map: LLM safety and security → Prompt injection and agent security

Abstract (arXiv)

Indirect prompt injection attacks threaten AI agents that execute consequential actions, motivating deterministic system-level defenses. Such defenses can provably block unsafe actions by enforcing confidentiality and integrity policies, but currently appear costly: they reduce task completion rates and increase token usage compared to probabilistic defenses. We argue that existing evaluations miss a key benefit of system-level defenses: reduced reliance on human oversight. We introduce autonomy metrics to quantify this benefit: the fraction of consequential actions an agent can execute without human-in-the-loop (HITL) approval while preserving security. To increase autonomy, we design a security-aware agent that (i) introduces richer HITL interactions, and (ii) explicitly plans for both task progress and policy compliance. We implement this agent design atop an existing information-flow control defense against prompt injection and evaluate it on the AgentDojo and WASP benchmarks. Experiments show that this approach yields higher autonomy without sacrificing utility.

Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Prompt injection and agent security, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 19 of its 34 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 11 Feb 2026.

Builds on

19 of 34 references.

Closest ancestors · 14

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks22 Apr
  2. 2025Adaptive Attacks Break Defenses Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on LLM Agents27 Feb
  3. 2025RTBAS: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection and Privacy Leakage13 Feb
  4. 2024The Task Shield: Enforcing Task Alignment to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents21 Dec
  5. 2024Embedding-based classifiers can detect prompt injection attacks29 Oct
  6. 2024Instructional Segment Embedding: Improving LLM Safety with Instruction Hierarchy9 Oct
  7. 2024SecAlign: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Preference Optimization7 Oct
  8. 2024System-Level Defense against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks: An Information Flow Control Perspective27 Sep
  9. 2024Get my drift? Catching LLM Task Drift with Activation Deltas2 Jun
  10. 2024The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions19 Apr
  11. 2024Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks With Spotlighting20 Mar
  12. 2024StruQ: Defending Against Prompt Injection with Structured Queries9 Feb
2 more
  1. 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Models21 Dec
  2. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injection23 Feb

Other references · 5

  1. 2022ReAct: Synergizing Reasoning and Acting in Language Modelscited by 8,355
  2. 2025Securing AI Agents with Information-Flow Controlcited by 108
  3. 2025The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against Llm Jailbreaks and Prompt Injectionscited by 108
  4. 2025Prompt Flow Integrity to Prevent Privilege Escalation in LLM Agentscited by 81
  5. 2024Permissive Information-Flow Analysis for Large Language Modelscited by 22

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 10.

10 papers.