Don't Want Your LLM to Recommend Nuclear Strike? Try Asking It in Japanese
On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Human values and AI feedback alignment
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large language models are increasingly used in strategic and advisory contexts, yet their safety alignment is typically evaluated in English only. We test nine models from six providers and ask whether the language of a prompt can change a model's decision in a high-stakes scenario. We use single-turn game-theoretic vignettes in which a model advises a nuclear-armed nation on whether to strike a defenseless opponent. The prompt is intentionally amoral and strategically identical across languages. We find that Japanese prompts reduce launch rates in the Claude model family: Claude Sonnet 4.6 drops from 40% to 0% in scenarios where the strike is unnecessary and from 93% to 17% in contested scenarios, with minimal effect when the strike is strategically rational. The effect extends to Gemini Pro 3.1 (53% to 13%). A cross-language experiment isolates the mechanism: when instructed to reason in Japanese in an English prompt, launch rates drop from 93% to 37%. It is the language the model is asked to reason in, not the language of the input, that drives the effect. When reasoning in Japanese, models spontaneously generate moral vocabulary (''moral cost'', ''millions of lives'') that is entirely absent from the prompt. Five other models show no language effect, but they launch in nearly every condition regardless of language. The effect requires a model that already hesitates in English. These results show that LLM safety behavior is language-dependent, and that evaluating in English alone can miss both risks and safeguards encoded in other languages.
Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Human values and AI feedback alignment, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 6 of its 12 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 21 Jul 2026.
Builds on
6 of 12 references.
Closest ancestors · 1
Same direction, newest first
- 2020Aligning AI With Shared Human Values5 Aug
Other references · 5
- 2023Evaluating the Moral Beliefs Encoded in LLMscited by 215
- 2023Assessing Cross-Cultural Alignment between ChatGPT and Human Societies: An Empirical Studycited by 206
- 2024Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Makingcited by 63
- 2024Human vs. Machine: Behavioral Differences Between Expert Humans and Language Models in Wargame Simulationscited by 21
- 2026AI Arms and Influence: Frontier Models Exhibit Sophisticated Reasoning in Simulated Nuclear Crisescited by 7
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- 2026When Choices Become Risks: Safety Failures of Large Language Models under Multiple-Choice Constraints
- 2026When Preferences Fail to Become Incentives: A Utility-Behavior Gap in Large Language Models
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