mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Human vs. Machine: Behavioral Differences Between Expert Humans and Language Models in Wargame Simulations

arXiv 2403.03407 ↗First posted 6 Mar 2024cs.CY cs.AI cs.CLcited by 20

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Abstract (arXiv)

To some, the advent of artificial intelligence (AI) promises better decision-making and increased military effectiveness while reducing the influence of human error and emotions. However, there is still debate about how AI systems, especially large language models (LLMs) that can be applied to many tasks, behave compared to humans in high-stakes military decision-making scenarios with the potential for increased risks towards escalation. To test this potential and scrutinize the use of LLMs for such purposes, we use a new wargame experiment with 214 national security experts designed to examine crisis escalation in a fictional U.S.-China scenario and compare the behavior of human player teams to LLM-simulated team responses in separate simulations. Here, we find that the LLM-simulated responses can be more aggressive and significantly affected by changes in the scenario. We show a considerable high-level agreement in the LLM and human responses and significant quantitative and qualitative differences in individual actions and strategic tendencies. These differences depend on intrinsic biases in LLMs regarding the appropriate level of violence following strategic instructions, the choice of LLM, and whether the LLMs are tasked to decide for a team of players directly or first to simulate dialog between a team of players. When simulating the dialog, the discussions lack quality and maintain a farcical harmony. The LLM simulations cannot account for human player characteristics, showing no significant difference even for extreme traits, such as "pacifist" or "aggressive sociopath." When probing behavioral consistency across individual moves of the simulation, the tested LLMs deviated from each other but generally showed somewhat consistent behavior. Our results motivate policymakers to be cautious before granting autonomy or following AI-based strategy recommendations.

Key facts. Cited by 20 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 12 of its 56 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 6 Mar 2024.

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12 of 56 references.

References · 12

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,712
  2. 2023Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Modelcited by 7,916
  3. 2022Constitutional AI: Harmlessness from AI Feedbackcited by 2,950
  4. 2023Whose Opinions Do Language Models Reflect?cited by 759
  5. 2023Open Problems and Fundamental Limitations of Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedbackcited by 743
  6. 2022Using Large Language Models to Simulate Multiple Humans and Replicate Human Subject Studiescited by 506
  7. 2023Role-Play with Large Language Modelscited by 290
  8. 2024Approaching Human-Level Forecasting with Language Modelscited by 102
  9. 2024Escalation Risks from Language Models in Military and Diplomatic Decision-Makingcited by 61
  10. 2023The Fourth International Verification of Neural Networks Competition (VNN-COMP 2023): Summary and Resultscited by 38
  11. 2021Student of Games: A unified learning algorithm for both perfect and imperfect information gamescited by 22
  12. 2024AI-Augmented Predictions: LLM Assistants Improve Human Forecasting Accuracycited by 21

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Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2024: 5; 2025: 7; 2026: 8.

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  1. 2024BetterBench: Assessing AI Benchmarks, Uncovering Issues, and Establishing Best Practicescited by 112
  2. 2024Risks from Language Models for Automated Mental Healthcare: Ethics and Structure for Implementationcited by 27
  3. 2024Measuring Free-Form Decision-Making Inconsistency of Language Models in Military Crisis Simulationscited by 11
  4. 2024GPT for Games: An Updated Scoping Review (2020-2024)cited by 10
  5. 2026AI Arms and Influence: Frontier Models Exhibit Sophisticated Reasoning in Simulated Nuclear Crisescited by 7
  6. 2024Markovian Transformers for Informative Language Modelingcited by 4
  7. 2025Teaching AI to Handle Exceptions: Supervised Fine-Tuning with Human-Aligned Judgmentcited by 4
  8. 2025The Prompt War: How AI Decides on a Military Interventioncited by 4
  9. 2025Scenarios in Computing Research: A Systematic Review of the Use of Scenario Methods for Exploring the Future of Computing Technologies in Societycited by 2
  10. 2025Managing Escalation in Off-the-Shelf Large Language Modelscited by 2
  11. 2026CivBench: Progress-Based Evaluation for LLMs' Strategic Decision-Making in Civilization Vcited by 2
  12. 2025When Trust Collides: Decoding Human-LLM Cooperation Dynamics through the Prisoner's Dilemmacited by 1
8 more
  1. 2025Shall We Play a Game? Language Models for Open-ended Wargamescited by 1
  2. 2025Developing and Validating the Arabic Version of the Attitudes Toward Large Language Models Scalecited by 0
  3. 2026Who Does What? Archetypes of Roles Assigned to LLMs During Human-AI Decision-Makingcited by 0
  4. 2026The Foreign Policy AI Evaluation Gapcited by 0
  5. 2026No One Wins in Nuclear War: A Social Simulation of Military Decision-makingcited by 0
  6. 2026Don't Want Your LLM to Recommend Nuclear Strike? Try Asking It in Japanesecited by 0
  7. 2026Language models judge war differently when tested for alignmentcited by 0
  8. 2026Position: AI Is Not Ready for Strategic Conflictscited by 0