mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Distributing Security Controls Through Harness Engineering

arXiv 2607.25890 ↗First posted 28 Jul 2026cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Software engineering coding agents

Abstract (arXiv)

AI coding agents are being adopted at historic speed, yet security and risk concerns remain the primary barrier to scaling agentic AI across organizations. Existing security controls for coding agents are not systematically distributed to engineering teams, and vendor-native solutions introduce ecosystem dependencies that may not suit every deployment context. This paper investigates whether off-the-shelf security controls can be implemented on commercial AI coding agents and scaled to a distributed user base via a custom agent harness. A phased testing methodology was applied across four agent configurations --- two commercial agents with and without controls, a baseline harness, and a security-hardened harness --- using a 23-test suite derived from the OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications. SHarD (Secure Harness Distribution), a distributable harness built on the Pi agent harness, demonstrated that three categories of security controls --- OS sandboxing, skill scanning, and tool restriction --- can be embedded and distributed via a single install command while retaining equivalent efficacy to direct installation on commercial agents. SHarD achieved an adjusted score of 100%, matching the best securely configured commercial agent, with no regression across any test category. Notable observations include evidence that model non-determinism produces inconsistent security outcomes and that autonomous agent behavior can cross system boundaries in ways that OS sandboxing directly mitigates. Initial characteristics toward a control harness fitness framework are proposed, and a third research question is identified for future investigation.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Software engineering coding agents, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 8 of its 31 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 28 Jul 2026.

Builds on

8 of 31 references.

References · 8

  1. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  2. 2026Agent Skills in the Wild: An Empirical Study of Security Vulnerabilities at Scalecited by 94
  3. 2026The 2025 AI Agent Index: Documenting Technical and Safety Features of Deployed Agentic AI Systemscited by 27
  4. 2026The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysiscited by 25
  5. 2026SafeHarness: Lifecycle-Integrated Security Architecture for LLM-based Agent Deploymentcited by 14
  6. 2025Breaking and Fixing Defenses Against Control-Flow Hijacking in Multi-Agent Systemscited by 12
  7. 2025No Free Lunch with Guardrailscited by 10
  8. 2026From Model Scaling to System Scaling: Scaling the Harness in Agentic AIcited by 8

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  1. 2026The Balkanization of Execution-Security Research for AI Coding Agents: Isolation, Access Control, and Time-of-Check-to-Time-of-Use Vulnerabilities
  2. 2026ClayBuddy: A Framework, Evaluation, & Mitigation of Coding Agent Failures
  3. 2026The Vulnerability With No CVE: Managing Persistent Gaps Between Mandate and Authority in AI Coding Agents
  4. 2026Scanning the Harness: A Repository Study of Configuration Exposures in AI Coding Agents
  5. 2026Security in the Age of AI Teammates: An Empirical Study of Agentic Pull Requests on GitHub
  6. 2026Setup Complete, Now You Are Compromised: Weaponizing Setup Instructions Against AI Coding Agents
  7. 2026Code as Agent Harness
  8. 2025Decoding the Configuration of AI Coding Agents: Insights from Claude Code Projects