ADS-C: Antidistillation Sampling for Classification

Knowledge distillation enables an adversary to replicate a proprietary classifier by querying its prediction interface and training a surrogate on the returned probability vectors. Antidistillation sampling, proposed for large language models, counters this threat with an input-dependent, gradient-directed perturbation of the served distribution; its transfer to classification has not been studied. Adapting the defense to classification, we show its behavior is governed by the distribution of the teacher's per-input confidence margins. Because well-trained classifiers are severely overconfident, the direct transfer exhibits an inert window: below a closed-form-predictable threshold, it affects neither attacker nor defender; beyond it, the defense undergoes a phase transition and degrades the teacher faster than the attacker's student. Temperature softening rescales the transition in closed form, and every temperature configuration lies on the same unfavorable trade-off curve. Our method, ADS-C, composes the perturbation under a closed-form, per-input margin budget that provably preserves every served top-1 prediction, so the defended teacher's accuracy equals the undefended teacher's identically. Under this guarantee the distilled student still loses 17.4 percentage points on CIFAR-100, 29.6 on CIFAR-10, and 13.3 on Tiny-ImageNet; matching this degradation with the unmodified defense costs 27.5, 32.9, and 22.2 points of teacher accuracy. Because served labels are unchanged, a hard-label attacker gains nothing, while the defended soft output trains a student up to 29.7 points below that floor: the incentive to distill served probabilities is not merely removed but reversed. To our knowledge, ADS-C is the first antidistillation defense for classification whose utility cost is exactly zero.