mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

Out-of-Distribution Generalization of Risk Aversion in Language Models

arXiv 2607.02755 ↗First posted 2 Jul 2026cs.LG cs.AIcited by 1

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Abstract (arXiv)

Training AIs to be risk-averse in resources could offer a failsafe in the event that AIs turn out misaligned. Misaligned but risk-averse AIs would tend to prefer low-risk, low-reward strategies like cooperation over high-risk, high-reward strategies like rebellion, limiting the downsides of any misalignment. But we can only feasibly train AIs to be risk-averse on low-stakes gambles, and we will only be safe if their risk aversion generalizes to astronomically-high-stakes gambles. Will it? To shed light on this question, we introduce RiskAverseOOD: a benchmark for measuring how well risk aversion generalizes out of distribution. We then offer some initial results. Using a variety of methods to make Qwen3-8B choose risk-aversely when the stakes are low, we find that we can induce substantial risk aversion when the stakes are astronomically high. From a baseline 2% rate of choosing a safe `Cooperate' option, we see rates around 70% (SFT and tie training) and 52% (DPO). Activation steering scores 78% but hurts capabilities and makes the model excessively risk-averse. We observe similar effects at different scales (Qwen3-1.7B and Qwen3-14B) and across model families (Gemma-3-12B-IT and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct). Overall, we find that risk aversion learned at low stakes can generalize OOD to astronomically high stakes, though not yet consistently enough to serve as a reliable failsafe. Achieving that level of consistency is an open problem.

Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 21 of its 38 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 2 Jul 2026.

Builds on

21 of 38 references.

References · 21

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,712
  2. 2021LoRA: Low-Rank Adaptation of Large Language Modelscited by 14,084
  3. 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,195
  4. 2023Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Modelcited by 7,916
  5. 2019Fine-Tuning Language Models from Human Preferencescited by 2,124
  6. 2023Representation Engineering: A Top-Down Approach to AI Transparencycited by 1,239
  7. 2023Steering Llama 2 via Contrastive Activation Additioncited by 1,009
  8. 2023Steering Language Models With Activation Engineeringcited by 824
  9. 2025SFT Memorizes, RL Generalizes: A Comparative Study of Foundation Model Post-trainingcited by 655
  10. 2022Exploring Length Generalization in Large Language Modelscited by 204
  11. 2024Are We Done with MMLU?cited by 178
  12. 2025Natural Emergent Misalignment from Reward Hacking in Production RLcited by 111
9 more
  1. 2025Tell me about yourself: LLMs are aware of their learned behaviorscited by 86
  2. 2022GLUE-X: Evaluating Natural Language Understanding Models from an Out-of-distribution Generalization Perspectivecited by 72
  3. 2025Utility Engineering: Analyzing and Controlling Emergent Value Systems in AIscited by 63
  4. 2024LLM economicus? Mapping the Behavioral Biases of LLMs via Utility Theorycited by 44
  5. 2024Decision-Making Behavior Evaluation Framework for LLMs under Uncertain Contextcited by 41
  6. 2025Steering Out-of-Distribution Generalization with Concept Ablation Fine-Tuningcited by 34
  7. 2025Evaluating and Aligning Human Economic Risk Preferences in LLMscited by 7
  8. 2026Spurious Correlation Learning in Preference Optimization: Mechanisms, Consequences, and Mitigation via Tie Trainingcited by 4
  9. 2025Risk Profiling and Modulation for LLMscited by 1

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Citing papers per year: 2026: 1.

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  1. 2025RiskPO: Risk-based Policy Optimization via Verifiable Reward for LLM Post-Training
  2. 2026Risk-Conditioned Fine-Tuning of Large Language Models
  3. 2025Risk-Averse Finetuning of Large Language Models
  4. 2025Statistical Impossibility and Possibility of Aligning LLMs with Human Preferences: From Condorcet Paradox to Nash Equilibrium
  5. 2025Exploring the Secondary Risks of Large Language Models
  6. 2026Training Generalizable Collaborative Agents via Strategic Risk Aversion
  7. 2026Alignment Risks from Capability-Seeking RL Training
  8. 2026When Preferences Fail to Become Incentives: A Utility-Behavior Gap in Large Language Models