It's a TRAP! Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark for Web Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
also in 1 more
Abstract (arXiv)
Web-based agents powered by large language models are increasingly used for tasks such as email management or professional networking. Their reliance on dynamic web content, however, makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks: adversarial instructions hidden in interface elements that persuade the agent to divert from its original task. We introduce the Task-Redirecting Agent Persuasion Benchmark (TRAP), a benchmark for studying how persuasion techniques misguide autonomous web agents on realistic tasks. Across six frontier models, agents are susceptible to prompt injection in 25% of tasks on average (13% for GPT-5 to 43% for DeepSeek-R1), with small interface or contextual changes often doubling success rates and revealing systemic, psychologically driven vulnerabilities in web-based agents. We also provide a modular social-engineering injection framework with controlled experiments on high-fidelity website clones, allowing for further benchmark expansion.
Key facts. Cited by 10 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 13 of its 23 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 29 Dec 2025.
Builds on
13 of 23 references.
Closest ancestors · 7
Same direction, newest first
- 2025OS-Harm: A Benchmark for Measuring Safety of Computer Use Agents17 Jun
- 2025SEC-bench: Automated Benchmarking of LLM Agents on Real-World Software Security Tasks13 Jun
- 2025AgentAuditor: Human-Level Safety and Security Evaluation for LLM Agents31 May
- 2024Refusal-Trained LLMs Are Easily Jailbroken As Browser Agents11 Oct
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
- 2024Agent Security Bench (ASB): Formalizing and Benchmarking Attacks and Defenses in LLM-based Agents3 Oct
- 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar
Other references · 6
- 2023WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agentscited by 2,006
- 2024LLM Evaluators Recognize and Favor Their Own Generationscited by 686
- 2025REAL: Benchmarking Autonomous Agents on Deterministic Simulations of Real Websitescited by 45
- 2025Red Teaming the Mind of the Machine: A Systematic Evaluation of Prompt Injection and Jailbreak Vulnerabilities in LLMscited by 34
- 2025From ASR to ASP: Evaluating Prompt Attack Vulnerabilities Against Open-Source LLMscited by 6
- 2025Adversarial Suffix Filtering: a Defense Pipeline for LLMscited by 5
Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 10.
10 papers.
- 2026The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agentscited by 12
- 2026Bounded Agents: Delegation Security for Multi-Agent AI Systemscited by 7
- 2026ClawTrap: A MITM-Based Red-Teaming Framework for Real-World OpenClaw Security Evaluationcited by 3
- 2026"I Strongly Suspect This Website Is a Scam": Benchmarking PII Leakage and Detection without Defense in Autonomous Web Agentscited by 2
- 2026Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teamingcited by 1
- 2026Are Android GUI Agents Robust Against Runtime Anomalies? AnTrap: Evaluating Agents in Dynamic Adversarial Environmentscited by 1
- 2026Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliabilitycited by 0
- 2026VATS: Exploiting Implicit Authority in Error-Path Injection via Systematic Mutationcited by 0
- 2026Right Screen, Wrong Transition: World Models as Verifiers for GUI Agentscited by 0
- 2026APEX-Harm: Evaluating Agent Safety in Shared Professional Workspacescited by 0
- 2026APEX-Harm: Evaluating Agent Safety in Shared Professional Workspaces9 Oct 2026
- 2026Right Screen, Wrong Transition: World Models as Verifiers for GUI Agents8 Oct 2026
- 2026Are Android GUI Agents Robust Against Runtime Anomalies? AnTrap: Evaluating Agents in Dynamic Adversarial Environments25 Aug 2026
- 2026Bounded Agents: Delegation Security for Multi-Agent AI Systems16 Aug 2026
- 2026VATS: Exploiting Implicit Authority in Error-Path Injection via Systematic Mutation6 Jun 2026
- 2026Domain-Conditioned Safety in Frontier Computer-Using Agents: A 793-Episode Browser Benchmark, a Coding-Domain Cross-Reference, and a Reproducibility Audit of Recent Red-Teaming3 Jun 2026
- 2026"I Strongly Suspect This Website Is a Scam": Benchmarking PII Leakage and Detection without Defense in Autonomous Web Agents30 May 2026
- 2026Securing Computer-Use Agents: A Unified Architecture-Lifecycle Framework for Deployment-Grounded Reliability8 May 2026
- 2026The Blind Spot of Agent Safety: How Benign User Instructions Expose Critical Vulnerabilities in Computer-Use Agents12 Apr 2026
- 2026ClawTrap: A MITM-Based Red-Teaming Framework for Real-World OpenClaw Security Evaluation19 Mar 2026
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026WebAgentGuard: A Reasoning-Driven Guard Model for Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks in Web Agents
- 2026When Bots Take the Bait: Exposing and Mitigating the Emerging Social Engineering Attack in Web Automation Agent
- 2025BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents
- 2026WARD: Adversarially Robust Defense of Web Agents Against Prompt Injections
- 2026MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks
- 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks
- 2026IPI-proxy: An Intercepting Proxy for Red-Teaming Web-Browsing AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection
- 2025WebGuard: Building a Generalizable Guardrail for Web Agents