ToolHazard: Scaling Adversarial Environments for Security Evaluation and Alignment of LLM-based Agents
On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large language model (LLM) agents integrated with external tools are vulnerable to indirect prompt injections embedded in environmental states. However, existing studies largely rely on manually implemented or reused environments, stochastic LLM-based tool simulation, and predefined injection locations, limiting scalable security research across broader domains. To bridge this gap, we propose **ToolHazard**, a scalable adversarial environment synthesis framework that reduces human engineering and supports expansion with additional seed domains and compute. Through an Environment Simulator, an Attacker Agent, and a User Simulator, ToolHazard synthesizes executable stateful environments, discovers viable injection points and generates environment-specific payloads, and constructs state-grounded long-horizon tasks. Based on ToolHazard, we build **ToolHazard-Bench** for stress-testing agents under complex workflows and diverse environmental attacks. Experiments reveal substantial agent vulnerabilities and show that injection timing and placement affect attack effectiveness. Moreover, ToolHazard-generated alignment data improves security on both ToolHazard-Bench and AgentDojo while preserving benign task utility.
Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 18 of its 40 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Aug 2026.
Builds on
18 of 40 references.
Closest ancestors · 10
Same direction, newest first
- 2026AdapTools: Adaptive Tool-based Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic LLMs24 Feb
- 2026AgentLAB: Benchmarking LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Attacks18 Feb
- 2026MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks9 Feb
- 2025Adversarial Reinforcement Learning for Large Language Model Agent Safety6 Oct
- 2025ChatInject: Abusing Chat Templates for Prompt Injection in LLM Agents26 Sep
- 2025Agent Safety Alignment via Reinforcement Learning11 Jul
- 2025AgentAlign: Navigating Safety Alignment in the Shift from Informative to Agentic Large Language Models29 May
- 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks22 Apr
- 2024Agent-SafetyBench: Evaluating the Safety of LLM Agents19 Dec
- 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
Other references · 8
- 2024DeepSeekMath: Pushing the Limits of Mathematical Reasoning in Open Language Modelscited by 9,379
- 2025Qwen3 Technical Reportcited by 8,820
- 2023WebArena: A Realistic Web Environment for Building Autonomous Agentscited by 2,006
- 2025DeepSeek-V3.2: Pushing the Frontier of Open Large Language Modelscited by 815
- 2025Reinforcement Learning Optimization for Large-Scale Learning: An Efficient and User-Friendly Scaling Librarycited by 101
- 2025AutoRedTeamer: Autonomous Red Teaming with Lifelong Attack Integrationcited by 43
- 2025SaRO: Enhancing LLM Safety through Reasoning-based Alignmentcited by 26
- 2026PIArena: A Platform for Prompt Injection Evaluationcited by 11
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Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.
2 papers.
Similar, not cited
Close in wording, no citation either way
- 2026Universal Defenses for Tool-Integrated LLM Agents Against Adversarial Attacks
- 2026ClawGuard: A Runtime Security Framework for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection
- 2024AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents
- 2025TAMAS: Benchmarking Adversarial Risks in Multi-Agent LLM Systems
- 2026BLINDSPOT: A Benchmark for Safety and Refusal Calibration in Long-Horizon Tool-Using Agents
- 2026SafeHarness: Lifecycle-Integrated Security Architecture for LLM-based Agent Deployment
- 2025Breaking Agent Backbones: Evaluating the Security of Backbone LLMs in AI Agents
- 2026Assessing Automated Prompt Injection Attacks in Agentic Environments