mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

CAMP: Cumulative Agentic Masking and Pruning for Privacy Protection in Multi-Turn LLM Conversations

arXiv 2604.16521 ↗First posted 16 Apr 2026cs.CR cs.AIcited by 0

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

The deployment of Large Language Models in agentic, multi-turn conversational settings has introduced a class of privacy vulnerabilities that existing protection mechanisms are not designed to address. Current approaches to Personally Identifiable Information (PII) masking operate on a per-turn basis, scanning each user message in isolation and replacing detected entities with typed placeholders before forwarding sanitized text to the model. While effective against direct identifier leakage within a single message, these methods are fundamentally stateless and fail to account for the compounding privacy risk that emerges when PII fragments accumulate across conversation turns. A user who separately discloses their name, employer, location, and medical condition across several messages has revealed a fully re-identifiable profile - yet no individual message would trigger a per-turn masker. We formalize this phenomenon as Cumulative PII Exposure (CPE) and propose CAMP (Cumulative Agentic Masking and Pruning), a cross-turn privacy protection framework for multi-turn LLM conversations. CAMP maintains a session-level PII registry, constructs a co-occurrence graph to model combination risk between entity types, computes a CPE score after each turn, and triggers retroactive masking of conversation history when the score crosses a configurable threshold. We evaluate CAMP on four synthetic multi-turn scenarios spanning healthcare, hiring, finance, and general conversation, demonstrating that per-turn baselines expose re-identifiable profiles that CAMP successfully neutralizes while preserving full conversational utility.

Key facts. No citing papers in the map yet (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 10 of its 20 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 16 Apr 2026.

Builds on

10 of 20 references.

References · 10

  1. 2020Extracting Training Data from Large Language Modelscited by 2,144
  2. 2023Scalable Extraction of Training Data from (Production) Language Modelscited by 415
  3. 2023Analyzing Leakage of Personally Identifiable Information in Language Modelscited by 278
  4. 2023Can LLMs Keep a Secret? Testing Privacy Implications of Language Models via Contextual Integrity Theorycited by 218
  5. 2023Beyond Memorization: Violating Privacy Via Inference with Large Language Modelscited by 167
  6. 2024Truthful Text Sanitization Guided by Inference Attackscited by 8
  7. 2024PII-Scope: A Comprehensive Study on Training Data PII Extraction Attacks in LLMscited by 6
  8. 2025Adaptive PII Mitigation Framework for Large Language Modelscited by 4
  9. 2025Self-Refining Language Model Anonymizers via Adversarial Distillationcited by 4
  10. 2026Privacy Guard & Token Parsimony by Prompt and Context Handling and LLM Routingcited by 1

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  1. 2025Semantically-Aware LLM Agent to Enhance Privacy in Conversational AI Services
  2. 2026PII-TRACE: A Benchmark for Context-Aware PII Detection in Multi-Turn LLM Conversations
  3. 2025Beyond Jailbreaking: Auditing Contextual Privacy in LLM Agents
  4. 2026NeuroFilter: Activation-Based Guardrails for Privacy-Conscious LLM Agents
  5. 2023"It's a Fair Game", or Is It? Examining How Users Navigate Disclosure Risks and Benefits When Using LLM-Based Conversational Agents
  6. 2026MuPPET: A Benchmark for Contextual Privacy of LLM Assistants in Multi-Party Conversations
  7. 2026Privacy Control in Conversational LLM Platforms: A Walkthrough Study
  8. 2025Protecting Users From Themselves: Safeguarding Contextual Privacy in Interactions with Conversational Agents