mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

A Trace-Based Assurance Framework for Agentic AI Orchestration: Contracts, Testing, and Governance

arXiv 2603.18096 ↗First posted 18 Mar 2026cs.MA cs.AIcited by 8

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

Key facts. Cited by 8 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 16 of its 27 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 18 Mar 2026.

Builds on

16 of 27 references.

Closest ancestors · 4

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2025WASP: Benchmarking Web Agent Security Against Prompt Injection Attacks22 Apr
  2. 2024AgentHarm: A Benchmark for Measuring Harmfulness of LLM Agents11 Oct
  3. 2024AgentDojo: A Dynamic Environment to Evaluate Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for LLM Agents19 Jun
  4. 2024InjecAgent: Benchmarking Indirect Prompt Injections in Tool-Integrated Large Language Model Agents5 Mar

Other references · 12

  1. 2023Judging LLM-as-a-Judge with MT-Bench and Chatbot Arenacited by 8,626
  2. 2021Evaluating Large Language Models Trained on Codecited by 8,320
  3. 2024HarmBench: A Standardized Evaluation Framework for Automated Red Teaming and Robust Refusalcited by 1,429
  4. 2023AgentBench: Evaluating LLMs as Agentscited by 1,267
  5. 2023GAIA: a benchmark for General AI Assistantscited by 1,128
  6. 2025Why Do Multi-Agent LLM Systems Fail?cited by 604
  7. 2023Ragas: Automated Evaluation of Retrieval Augmented Generationcited by 418
  8. 2023NeMo Guardrails: A Toolkit for Controllable and Safe LLM Applications with Programmable Railscited by 365
  9. 2023Benchmarking and Defending Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Language Modelscited by 264
  10. 2025Measuring Agents in Productioncited by 37
  11. 2017Chaos Engineeringcited by 19
  12. 2018A Survey of Challenges for Runtime Verification from Advanced Application Domains (Beyond Software)cited by 9

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 8.

8 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Engineering Reliable Commit Gates for Agentic AI: Cost-Aware Verification Portfolios under Common-Mode Data Failures
  2. 2026A Policy Algebra for Trust-Preserving Agentic AI Execution
  3. 2026Securing Agentic AI: From Per-Action Checks to Trajectory Assurance
  4. 2026Trust Is Not a Score: Runtime Assurance Contracts for High-Risk AI Agents
  5. 2026TriCEGAR: A Trace-Driven Abstraction Mechanism for Agentic AI
  6. 2026SARC: A Governance-by-Architecture Framework for Agentic AI Systems
  7. 2026Beyond Component Testing: Validating Agentic AI Systems
  8. 2026Runtime Governance for Agentic AI: Action-Boundary Control with Trusted Provenance and Fail-Closed Execution