mlsanityData to 14 Oct 2026

Alignment Makes Language Models Normative, Not Descriptive

arXiv 2603.17218 ↗First posted 17 Mar 2026cs.CL cs.AI cs.GTcited by 4

On the map: LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation → Human values and AI feedback alignment

Abstract (arXiv)

Post-training alignment optimizes language models to match human preference signals, but this objective is not equivalent to modeling observed human behavior. We compare 120 base-aligned model pairs on more than 10,000 real human decisions in multi-round strategic games - bargaining, persuasion, negotiation, and repeated matrix games. In these settings, base models outperform their aligned counterparts in predicting human choices by nearly 10:1, robustly across model families, prompt formulations, and game configurations. This pattern reverses, however, in settings where human behavior is more likely to follow normative predictions: aligned models dominate on one-shot textbook games across all 12 types tested and on non-strategic lottery choices - and even within the multi-round games themselves, at round one, before interaction history develops. This boundary-condition pattern suggests that alignment induces a normative bias: it improves prediction when human behavior is relatively well captured by normative solutions, but hurts prediction in multi-round strategic settings, where behavior is shaped by descriptive dynamics such as reciprocity, retaliation, and history-dependent adaptation. These results reveal a fundamental trade-off between optimizing models for human use and using them as proxies for human behavior.

Key facts. Cited by 4 papers in the map (data through 14 Oct 2026). Placed in Human values and AI feedback alignment, one of 10 directions in LLM alignment / RLHF / preference optimisation. Builds on 22 of its 35 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 17 Mar 2026.

Builds on

22 of 35 references.

References · 22

  1. 2022Training language models to follow instructions with human feedbackcited by 15,971
  2. 2023Direct Preference Optimization: Your Language Model is Secretly a Reward Modelcited by 8,065
  3. 2023Whose Opinions Do Language Models Reflect?cited by 773
  4. 2022Out of One, Many: Using Language Models to Simulate Human Samplescited by 752
  5. 2022Using Large Language Models to Simulate Multiple Humans and Replicate Human Subject Studiescited by 515
  6. 2022Using cognitive psychology to understand GPT-3cited by 398
  7. 2023Understanding the Effects of RLHF on LLM Generalisation and Diversitycited by 396
  8. 2023Do LLMs exhibit human-like response biases? A case study in survey designcited by 180
  9. 2022RL with KL penalties is better viewed as Bayesian inferencecited by 135
  10. 2023On the Calibration of Large Language Models and Alignmentcited by 73
  11. 2024On the Algorithmic Bias of Aligning Large Language Models with RLHF: Preference Collapse and Matching Regularizationcited by 72
  12. 2025Language Model Fine-Tuning on Scaled Survey Data for Predicting Distributions of Public Opinionscited by 66
10 more
  1. 2024Large Language Models Assume People are More Rational than We Really arecited by 54
  2. 2023Instructed to Bias: Instruction-Tuned Language Models Exhibit Emergent Cognitive Biascited by 53
  3. 2025KL-Regularized Reinforcement Learning is Designed to Mode Collapsecited by 31
  4. 2024GLEE: A Unified Framework and Benchmark for Language-based Economic Environmentscited by 20
  5. 2024Capturing the Complexity of Human Strategic Decision-Making with Machine Learningcited by 14
  6. 2024Can LLMs Replace Economic Choice Prediction Labs? The Case of Language-based Persuasion Gamescited by 12
  7. 2023Human Choice Prediction in Language-based Persuasion Games: Simulation-based Off-Policy Evaluationcited by 8
  8. 2026Do Instruction-Tuned Models Always Perform Better Than Base Models? Evidence from Math and Domain-Shifted Benchmarkscited by 4
  9. 2025Predicting Human Choice Between Textually Described Lotteriescited by 1
  10. 2026Sequential LLM Release Facilitates Manipulation in Regulated Marketscited by 1

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Cited by year (2026 to 14 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 4.

4 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2024Understanding the Learning Dynamics of Alignment with Human Feedback
  2. 2026Are Human-Aligned Models Models of Humans? A Turing-Test Gap in Preference Alignment
  3. 2024Are LLMs Socially Adaptive? Contrasting Belief Evolution in Large Language Models and Humans
  4. 2025GTAlign: Game-Theoretic Alignment of LLM Assistants for Social Welfare
  5. 2025Alignment is Localized: A Causal Probe into Preference Layers
  6. 2026From Constitutions to Control: Interpretable Rewards for Aligning Language Models
  7. 2025Statistical Impossibility and Possibility of Aligning LLMs with Human Preferences: From Condorcet Paradox to Nash Equilibrium
  8. 2025Operationalizing Pluralistic Values in Large Language Model Alignment Reveals Trade-offs in Safety, Inclusivity, and Model Behavior