Human-Centred LLM Privacy Audits: Findings and Frictions
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Abstract (arXiv)
Large language models (LLMs) learn statistical associations from massive training corpora and user interactions, and deployed systems can surface or infer information about individuals. Yet people lack practical ways to inspect what a model associates with their name. We report interim findings from an ongoing study and introduce LMP2, a browser-based self-audit tool. In two user studies (Ntotal=458), GPT-4o predicts 11 of 50 features for everyday people with ≥60% accuracy, and participants report wanting control over LLM-generated associations despite not considering all outputs privacy violations. To validate our probing method, we evaluate eight LLMs on public figures and non-existent names, observing clear separation between stable name-conditioned associations and model defaults. Our findings also contribute to exposing a broader generative AI evaluation crisis: when outputs are probabilistic, context-dependent, and user-mediated through elicitation, what model--individual associations even include is under-specified and operationalisation relies on crafting probes and metrics that are hard to validate or compare. To move towards reliable, actionable human-centred LLM privacy audits, we identify nine frictions that emerged in our study and offer recommendations for future work and the design of human-centred LLM privacy audits.
Key facts. Cited by 1 paper in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Builds on 24 of its 63 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 12 Mar 2026.
Builds on
24 of 63 references.
References · 24
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12 more
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- 2024Generative AI and Perceptual Harms: Who's Suspected of using LLMs?cited by 11
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- 2025Breaking the Benchmark: Revealing LLM Bias via Minimal Contextual Augmentationcited by 1
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