mlsanityData to 7 Oct 2026

AgenticCyOps: Securing Multi-Agentic AI Integration in Enterprise Cyber Operations

arXiv 2603.09134 ↗First posted 10 Mar 2026cs.CR cs.MA cs.SEcited by 2

On the map: LLM agents and tool use → Agent threats, guardrails and governance

Abstract (arXiv)

Multi-agent systems (MAS) powered by LLMs promise adaptive, reasoning-driven enterprise workflows, yet granting agents autonomous control over tools, memory, and communication introduces attack surfaces absent from deterministic pipelines. While current research largely addresses prompt-level exploits and narrow individual vectors, it lacks a holistic architectural model for enterprise-grade security. We introduce AgenticCyOps (Securing Multi-Agentic AI Integration in Enterprise Cyber Operations), a framework built on a systematic decomposition of attack surfaces across component, coordination, and protocol layers, revealing that documented vectors consistently trace back to two integration surfaces: tool orchestration and memory management. Building on this observation, we formalize these integration surfaces as primary trust boundaries and define five defensive principles: authorized interfaces, capability scoping, verified execution, memory integrity & synchronization, and access-controlled data isolation; each aligned with established compliance standards (NIST, ISO 27001, GDPR, EU AI Act). We apply the framework to a Security Operations Center (SOC) workflow, adopting the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as the structural basis, with phase-scoped agents, consensus validation loops, and per-organization memory boundaries. Coverage analysis, attack path tracing, and trust boundary assessment confirm that the design addresses the documented attack vectors with defense-in-depth, intercepts three of four representative attack chains within the first two steps, and reduces exploitable trust boundaries by a minimum of 72% compared to a flat MAS, positioning AgenticCyOps as a foundation for securing enterprise-grade integration.

Key facts. Cited by 2 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Agent threats, guardrails and governance, one of 16 directions in LLM agents and tool use. Builds on 22 of its 56 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 10 Mar 2026.

Builds on

22 of 56 references.

Closest ancestors · 12

Same direction, newest first

  1. 2026Security Threat Modeling for Emerging AI-Agent Protocols: A Comparative Analysis of MCP, A2A, Agora, and ANP11 Feb
  2. 2025A-MemGuard: A Proactive Defense Framework for LLM-Based Agent Memory29 Sep
  3. 2025Extending the OWASP Multi-Agentic System Threat Modeling Guide: Insights from Multi-Agent Security Research13 Aug
  4. 2025BlockA2A: Towards Secure and Verifiable Agent-to-Agent Interoperability2 Aug
  5. 2025SAGA: A Security Architecture for Governing AI Agentic Systems27 Apr
  6. 2025Prompt Flow Integrity to Prevent Privilege Escalation in LLM Agents17 Mar
  7. 2025Multi-Agent Systems Execute Arbitrary Malicious Code15 Mar
  8. 2025AgentSafe: Safeguarding Large Language Model-based Multi-agent Systems via Hierarchical Data Management6 Mar
  9. 2025Red-Teaming LLM Multi-Agent Systems via Communication Attacks20 Feb
  10. 2025Unveiling Privacy Risks in LLM Agent Memory17 Feb
  11. 2024AgentPoison: Red-teaming LLM Agents via Poisoning Memory or Knowledge Bases17 Jul
  12. 2024LLM Agents can Autonomously Hack Websites6 Feb

Other references · 10

  1. 2020Extracting Training Data from Large Language Modelscited by 2,144
  2. 2023Not what you've signed up for: Compromising Real-World LLM-Integrated Applications with Indirect Prompt Injectioncited by 1,339
  3. 2022Red Teaming Language Models with Language Modelscited by 983
  4. 2025Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agentscited by 66
  5. 2025Collaborative Memory: Multi-User Memory Sharing in LLM Agents with Dynamic Access Controlcited by 56
  6. 2021Adversarial Attacks On Multi-Agent Communicationcited by 48
  7. 2025Towards Trustworthy GUI Agents: A Surveycited by 33
  8. 2024LOCALINTEL: Generating Organizational Threat Intelligence from Global and Local Cyber Knowledgecited by 22
  9. 2026The Orchestration of Multi-Agent Systems: Architectures, Protocols, and Enterprise Adoptioncited by 13
  10. 2025FALCON: Transforming Cyber Threat Intelligence into Deployable IDS Rules with Self-Reflectioncited by 4

Built on by

Cited by year (2026 to 7 Oct)

Citing papers per year: 2026: 2.

2 papers.

Similar, not cited

Close in wording, no citation either way

  1. 2026Authenticated Workflows: A Systems Approach to Protecting Agentic AI
  2. 2025The Evolution of Agentic AI in Cybersecurity: From Single LLM Reasoners to Multi-Agent Systems and Autonomous Pipelines
  3. 2026The PBSAI Governance Ecosystem: A Multi-Agent AI Reference Architecture for Securing Enterprise AI Estates
  4. 2026Trustworthy Agentic AI: A Comprehensive Cybersecurity and Systems Survey on Threat Landscapes, Defense Architectures, and Open Challenges
  5. 2026AgentSOC: A Multi-Layer Agentic AI Framework for Security Operations Automation
  6. 2025TRiSM for Agentic AI: A Review of Trust, Risk, and Security Management in LLM-based Agentic Multi-Agent Systems
  7. 2026When LLMs Team Up: A Coordinated Attack Framework for Automated Cyber Intrusions
  8. 2026Securing Agentic AI: From Per-Action Checks to Trajectory Assurance