Stateless Yet Not Forgetful: Implicit Memory as a Hidden Channel in LLMs
On the map: LLM safety and security → Backdoor and data poisoning attacks
Abstract (arXiv)
Large language models (LLMs) are commonly treated as stateless: once an interaction ends, no information is assumed to persist unless it is explicitly stored and re-supplied. We challenge this assumption by introducing implicit memory-the ability of a model to carry state across otherwise independent interactions by encoding information in its own outputs and later recovering it when those outputs are reintroduced as input. This mechanism does not require any explicit memory module, yet it creates a persistent information channel across inference requests. As a concrete demonstration, we introduce a new class of temporal backdoors, which we call time bombs. Unlike conventional backdoors that activate on a single trigger input, time bombs activate only after a sequence of interactions satisfies hidden conditions accumulated via implicit memory. We show that such behavior can be induced today through straightforward prompting or fine-tuning. Beyond this case study, we analyze broader implications of implicit memory, including covert inter-agent communication, benchmark contamination, targeted manipulation, and training-data poisoning. Finally, we discuss detection challenges and outline directions for stress-testing and evaluation, with the goal of anticipating and controlling future developments. To promote future research, we release code and data at: https://github.com/microsoft/implicitMemory.
Key facts. Cited by 3 papers in the map (data through 7 Oct 2026). Placed in Backdoor and data poisoning attacks, one of 12 directions in LLM safety and security. Builds on 39 of its 66 references that are in the map. First posted on arXiv 9 Feb 2026.
Builds on
39 of 66 references.
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Other references · 38
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26 more
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Built on by
Citing papers per year: 2026: 3.
3 papers.
- 2026Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agentscited by 22
- 2026AI Agents May Always Fall for Prompt Injectionscited by 9
- 2026Stateful Agent Backdoorcited by 1
- 2026AI Agents May Always Fall for Prompt Injections17 May 2026
- 2026Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agents14 May 2026
- 2026Stateful Agent Backdoor7 May 2026